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In this paper I directly test the hypothesis that interactions between inventors of differ-
ent firms drive knowledge spillovers. I construct a network of publicly traded companies
in which each link is a function of the relative proportion of two firms’ inventors who
have former patent collaborators in both organizations. I use this measure to weigh the
impact of R&D performed by each firm on the productivity and innovation outcomes
of its network linkages. An empirical concern is that the resulting estimates may reflect
unobserved, simultaneous determinants of firm performance, network connections and
external R&D. I address this problem with an innovative IV strategy, motivated by a
game-theoretic model of firm interaction. I instrument the R&D of one firm’s connec-
tions with that of other firms that are sufficiently distant in network space. With the
resulting spillover estimates, I calculate that among firms connected to the network
the marginal social return of R&D amounts to approximately 112% of the marginal
private return.
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Theories of knowledge spillovers have occupied a central position in economic analysis
since at least Marshall (1890) posited their role to explain the apparent productivity
advantages for firms to cluster near one another in manufacturing districts of 19th
century England. Since then, knowledge spillovers have entered economic theories
of industrial innovation, geographic agglomeration, economic growth, international
trade and more. However, the exact mechanisms through which knowledge spills
from one agent or organization to another are still unclear. Conjectures about human
interaction and spatial proximity as drivers of information exchange are typically as-
sociated with methods of measuring spillovers that are unable to test their hypotheses
directly, as they are typically based on aggregate R&D metrics.
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on the quantitative assessment
of R&D spillovers by directly measuring the role of individual relationships in the
diffusion of industrially valuable knowledge. I estimate the effect of R&D performed
by different firms, that are linked through their scientists, on their reciprocal perfor-
mance and innovation rates. In particular, I exploit collaborations on past patents in
order to identify inventors who are likely to maintain personal linkages across different
organizations over time. For each pair of firms, I measure the degree of interaction be-
tween the two R&D teams and the potential for information exchange by the relative
proportion of cross-connected inventors. This metric changes over time, as scientists
move across firms or acquire new collaborators.
By combining firm-level data with patent data that identify individual inventors
over the course of their patenting history, I am able to construct a dynamic network of
knowledge exchange. This network includes the largest, most innovative and R&D in-
tensive U.S. firms, and it becomes tighter over time thanks to the increase in the total
number of connections. The R&D of connected firms, weighted by the intensity of the
links, is significantly and positively correlated with firm performance and innovation
rates as measured by patent counts. This contrasts with well-established measures of
spillovers that are based, for instance, on the technological similarities between firms
(Jaffe, 1986, 1989). Among companies that comprise the network, these measures are
not significantly and robustly correlated with relevant firm-level outcomes.
It is arduous, however, to attribute a causal interpretation to these findings. As
in other studies about spillovers and externalities of different kinds, these correlations
may simply reflect the existence of common unobserved confounders simultaneously
driving R&D, innovation, as well as firm performance (Griliches, 1998). For example,
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a sudden technological breakthrough in a technological niche where few connected
firms operate could stimulate additional R&D efforts while, at the same time, facili-
tating productivity-enhancing follow-up discoveries. This corresponds to the problem
of correlated effects in the classification by Manski (1993) of identification issues in
the estimation of spillover effects. In addition, it is possible that network linkages are
themselves endogenous. For instance, more reputed and better-connected scientists
might be attracted to more productive and better paying firms. Under these circum-
stances, standard estimates of R&D spillovers may be biased in either directions.
Thanks to the characteristics of the network that I observe, I can formulate a novel
empirical strategy that addresses these problems. The basic intuition is straightfor-
ward. Unobserved factors shared by a pair of connected firms – call them i and j –
may bias standard estimates of spillovers as long as they are reflected in R&D expen-
ditures. Suppose that a third firm k, which is not connected to i, shares some of these
unobservables with j but not with i. It is not necessary, which is a crucial point, that
j and k are themselves directly connected, but only that k is “closer” to j than it is to
i in the network space; this may be the result, say, of a process of network formation
in which firms are more likely to be connected if they are similar. If shared external
circumstances affect R&D investment as hypothesized, and firms have private infor-
mation on their own unobservables (so that these are not endogenously transmitted),
R&D should be correlated within firm pairs (i, j) and (j, k), but not within the pair
(i, k). Hence the R&D of firm k, while correlating with that of firm j, is orthogonal
with respect to the unobservables of firm i. I argue that relationships of this kind are
commonplace in networks, as evidenced by specific statistical regularities.
To formalize this idea, I describe a game of R&D investment played in a network
of firms. R&D exerts reciprocal spillovers across linkages; in addition, firms are hit
by shocks that are correlated with the characteristics of the network. Consequently,
equilibrium R&D also co-varies across neighboring nodes, and the resulting correlation
is endogenously amplified by the strategic anticipation of investment choices made
by other firms. However, under reasonable assumptions that allow for both flexible
patterns of dependence between the shocks and the network, and varying information
structures of the game, the model predicts the existence of a degree of separation at
which the R&D of different firms is independent. As the R&D choices of firms that
lie at the bound also correlate with those of direct links, the former can serve as valid
instruments. Empirically, I find no significant cross-correlation of firms’ R&D at three
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degrees of separation. This evidence motivates the use of instrumental variables based
upon the R&D of “indirect connections” located at distance three as my best choice.
Without applying this strategy, I find substantial effects of connected firms’ R&D
on firm performance – expressed in terms of productivity and market value – as well
as on patent production. However, when instrumenting peers’ knowledge with the
R&D choices of indirect links located at distance two or three, I obtain larger point
estimates of spillover effects, especially for the productivity and patent production
outcomes. That such difference is only apparent when employing the distance three
instrument in isolation is remarkably consistent with the proposed model. I interpret
these findings as evidence that R&D is in fact driven by common unobservables across
connected firms, and I advance several hypotheses to explain why this translates into
a negative bias of OLS estimates. In light of the results, I estimate the social returns
of R&D to be about 112% of the private returns among connected firms.
This paper builds on the traditional literature of industrial and innovation eco-
nomics about the determinants of productivity at the firm level, especially the private
and social returns of R&D.1 The quest for R&D spillovers in particular, initiated with
the original intuitions by Griliches (1964, 1979, 1992), has developed into its current
empirical framework with the cited contributions by Jaffe. Successive research has
experimented with metrics of spillovers, based for example on cross-industry transac-
tions or flows of patent citations, that are alternative to Jaffe’s concept of technological
proximity ; for a review of these studies see e.g. Hall, Mairesse, and Mohnen (2010).
Other authors have assessed more specific mechanisms of knowledge diffusion. For
example, Branstetter and Sakakibara (2002), as well as König, Liu, and Zenou (2014)2
study the effect of R&D joint ventures. Griffith, Harrison, and Van Reenen (2006)
instead examine the consequences of UK firms’ technological outsourcing in the US.
In recent work Bloom, Schankerman, and Van Reenen (2013) have addressed a
longstanding issue in the literature, disentangling R&D spillovers from the negative
competition effect that is due to the R&D of product market rivals. In their article
they also postulate a microfoundation of knowledge spillovers based on the frequency
of personal or professional interactions between inventors, but they do not explicitly
test this mechanism in their empirical analysis. In this contribution, I provide for the
1For a general survey see Syverson (2011).
2König et al. (2014) also take a network-based approach to their analysis of joint ventures, which
bears similarities with the one in this paper. Their identification strategy is, however, different, and
it does not address potential problems of correlated confounders.
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first time a measure of cross-firms spillovers grounded on the observation of an actual
social network of inventors: the patent collaboration network. This measure aims at
capturing all kinds of individual interactions between inventors that eventually result
in joint projects. While spillovers certainly also occur through less solid, harder to
observe types of interactions, the proposed measure has the advantage of generality.
In fact, collaborative cross-firm projects are common to other mechanisms examined
in the literature, such as R&D joint ventures or technological outsourcing.
This work provides empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that spillovers
are caused by the exchange of ideas between individuals. Therefore, it is related to the
research about the micro-level determinants of performance in the workplace. Moretti
(2004) argues that productivity is related to how well-educated the workforce is in the
environment in which a plant is located, suggesting that knowledge spillovers have a
local scope.3 Mas and Moretti (2009) demonstrate how “peer effects” apply at work,
as coworkers intensify their efforts when they observe others doing increasingly so.
Serafinelli (2016) shows that firm productivity is related to positive flows of workers
with experience from companies at the top of the productivity distribution. In the
context of scientific production, which is especially relevant for this work, Azoulay,
Graff Zivin, and Wang (2010) evidence the negative impact of superstars’ deaths on
the publication rate of scientific collaborators.4
The empirical strategy that I propose, centered on the idea of using the R&D
of “sufficiently distant” firms to predict the R&D of direct neighbors, is itself a con-
tribution to the literature of spatial and network econometrics. While instrumental
variables of this kind are not novel as a concept (Bramoullé et al., 2009; De Giorgi
et al., 2010), both my objective and conceptual framework5 are different. In the cited
3Knowledge spillovers are theorized to be one of the determinants of agglomeration economies
(Moretti, 2011). There are, in fact, complementarities between the empirical literature about spatial
agglomeration effects, and studies on R&D spillovers. Jaffe et al. (1993, 2000) and Thompson and
Fox-Kean (2005) discuss whether the spatial concentration of patent citations can be considered as
evidence of localized knowledge spillovers. Bloom, Schankerman, and Van Reenen (2013) as well as
Lychagin et al. (2016) attempt to identify a geographic scope of R&D spillovers, by attributing a
differential effect to the R&D of “spilling” firms that are located closer in space.
4However, in a related study Waldinger (2011) does not find similarly convincing evidence fol-
lowing the expulsion of scientists from Nazi Germany.
5The model developed in this paper is inspired by those in Calvó-Armengol et al. (2009), Conley
and Udry (2010), Kranton et al. (2014), Blume et al. (2015), while differing from all of them. The
empirical reduced form of the model that I estimate is a production function with R&D spillovers; it
corresponds to a Spatial Durbin Error Model (SDEM) from the classification of spatial econometric
models by Elhorst (2014), because it includes both an analogue of Manski’s “exogenous effect” and
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articles, in fact, IVs are meant to solve Manski’s “reflection” problem, by extending
methods originally devised for spatially autoregressive models (Kelejian and Prucha,
1998) to the case of networks. Here instead, the aim of the proposed methodology is
to disentangle spillover effects from spatially distributed unobservables or “correlated
effects.”6 The latter are, according to some authors (Angrist, 2014), the main cause
for concern regarding studies on peer effects. Given that, as I illustrate, correlated
effects and network formation are closely related, under the maintained hypotheses
the proposed strategy is also robust to endogeneity of firms’ connections. To the best
of my knowledge this approach is new in the spatial econometrics literature, and it
can be viewed as a spatial extension of familiar GMM methods for dynamic panels.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 1 illustrates the game-theoretic frame-
work that models R&D investment in a network in the presence of spillovers. Section 2
describes the collaboration-based measures of connections, and provides a description
of the resulting dynamic network. Section 3 outlines the econometric framework and
discusses the empirical strategy of the paper. Section 4 presents the empirical results
of the analysis and their economic implications. Finally, Section 5 provides some con-
cluding remarks. A set of appendices accompanies this article, complementing both
the theoretical and the empirical analyses.
1 Analytical Framework
In this section I outline the theoretical framework of this paper. The model I describe
explores the equilibrium relationship of firms’ choice of R&D investment when they
exert network externalities on each other and are also subject to simultaneous corre-
lated shocks. The objective of the model is to formalize the intuition motivating the
identification strategy of the paper. In the appendices I provide formal proofs of the
results, as well as additional comments on the model and possible extensions of it.
spatially correlated errors. The main feature of my model is that both are interdependent, inducing
endogeneity. Note that a complete information version of this model can be manipulated so to return
a spatially autoregressive (SAR) model of either R&D or final firm outcomes. In these cases, Manski’s
“endogenous effect” would be a function of the spillover parameter of the production function.
6The procedure described in Bramoullé et al. (2009) and implemented in De Giorgi et al. (2010)
has been conceived for cross-sectional data made of multiple, separate networks. If correlated effects
are identical within networks, taking fixed effects at the network level is sufficient to partial them
out – as it is claimed in some of the empirical applications based on their framework. If common
shocks are, instead, characterized by a more complex spatial dependence as a function of network
topology, their approach would result in inconsistent estimates even with a sample of networks.
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1.1 Model Setup
An economy consists of a set I of N firms, whose output depends on conventional in-
puts (e.g. capital, labor) as well as on knowledge capital (Griliches, 1979). Knowledge
is the result of R&D activity performed by teams of researchers – be they professional
scientists, occasional inventors, academic collaborators of firms or other individuals
– who are linked together in a network of professional relationships. These networks
transcend the borders of the individual firms: I represent the intensity of connections
between any two firms as the N2-dimensional set G = {gij : i, j = 1, . . . , N}, where
(i, j) ∈ I × I denotes any pair of firms. By adopting standard normalizations, I set
gij ∈ [0, 1] for all pairs such that i 6= j, as well as gii = 0 for every firm i in I. The
firm-level network of knowledge flows is thus given by the pair of sets (I,G). In this
paper I assume that the network is undirected, that is gij = gji for each pair of firms
(i, j); the results of the model are however easily extended to directed networks.
Thanks to the formal and informal exchange of information that happens through
the firm-level network, one firm’s knowledge depends not only on R&D performed in-
house, but also on the R&D of other, connected firms. Specifically, I assume that the
knowledge capital S˜i of firm i is a Cobb-Douglas function of its own R&D investment,












In the expression above, parameters γ ∈ (0, 1) and δ ∈ (0, 1) represent, respectively,
the relative contribution of in-house R&D and knowledge spillovers to the knowledge
capital of some firm i. The actual intensity of knowledge flows directed from firm j to
firm i, however, depends on the strength of their link in the network, expressed by the
spillover weight gij. Note that this functional form implies that R&D is a strategic
complement. A model featuring R&D as a strategic substitute would yield different
empirical predictions about the sign of R&D cross-correlation in the network, but
would not invalidate the main results that support identification.7
7Whether R&D is truly more a strategic complement or a strategic substitute is a controversial
matter: it is a notoriously hard dichotomy to test. R&D is usually thought to be both – a complement
and a substitute – to some degree. As Jaffe (1986) put it, this is a ultimately a question about the
assumed functional form, and standard econometric techniques are not the best means to assess
curvature parameters beyond first derivatives.
6
Knowledge capital S˜i enters as an additional input into the general production
function of firm i, which is also Cobb-Douglas:

















where Xiq for q = 1, . . . , Q is any conventional input (like capital or labor), βq ∈ (0, 1)
being its associated elasticity parameter. In addition, output depends on a stochastic
shock ωi ∈ R, representing other technological and environmental factors that affect
firms’ productivity or profitability in either direction. For example, ωi may enclose
technological knowledge in the common domain that is specific to the industry in
which firm i operates, or efficiency-enhancing managerial and organizational practices
whose acquisition is independent of firms’ R&D effort.
It is likely that two firms i and j that are connected in the network of knowledge
flows (gij 6= 0) share some related technological factors that affect their performance.
A concrete, famous case is the semiconductor industry. For decades, firms operating
in that sector have been enjoying parallel trends in the development of integrated
circuits with an increasingly higher count of transistors: the so-called “Moore’s Law.”
Another pertinent example is the pharmaceutical sector, where firms developing new
drugs typically enjoy common advantages based on the results of basic research. This
cross-correlation of firms’ technologies in the network can be related to the process of
network formation: firms happen to learn from some other firms and their inventors
(and not others) because they operate in similar technological niches.
In addition, the R&D cost function z (Si, $i) of firms also depends on a random
variable $i ∈ R which can be spatially correlated in the network. For every firm i:
z (Si, $i) = e
$iSi
that is, the cost borne for an additional unit of R&D Si increases with larger values of
$i. Cross-correlation of R&D costs in the network can be due to the fact that firms
with similar technological characteristics ωi, which as argued may relate to the process
of network formation, also face similar costs $i. In practice, the spatial dependence
in R&D costs may reflect, for example, common developments in the supply of labor
endowed with specific technological skills, or in financing opportunities. Note that I
make no restriction on the sign of the covariance Cov (ωi, $i) between the productivity
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and cost shocks of a firm, but I expect it to be positive in high-tech industries.
To allow for dependence between the network, the technological characteristics of
different firms and their cost factors, I do not explicitly model network formation.
Instead, I keep the model general by treating G, the vector of technological shocks
ω = (ω1, . . . , ωN) and the vector of cost shocks $ = ($1, . . . , $N) as random draws
from some joint distribution F (ω,$,G). I impose no restriction on this distribution,
except that the process of network formation or other determinants enclosed in F are
unlikely to set firms with similar characteristics too far apart in network space. To
formalize this idea, it is useful to introduce a notion of distance between any two firms
in the network. Specifically, let dij ∈ N be the minimum path length between firms
i and j: the lowest number of firms linked together as a sequence (path) indirectly
connecting i to j.8 Note that dij is a function of G, and is itself a random variable.
Armed with this concept, it is easier to express the following assumption.
Assumption 1. Consider the set G of all realizations of G with positive probability
in F (·). There exists some positive integer C such that, for all G ∈ G, the conditional
distribution F (ω,$| G) has the following property for all appropriate pairs (i, j):
Cov (ωi, ωj| dij > C) = 0
Cov ($i, $j| dij > C) = 0
that is, if the minimum path length between i and j is higher than C, their productivity
shocks ωi and ωj are mutually independent, and so are their cost shocks $i and $j.
In the context of this article Assumption 1 is interpreted as follows: if two firms
have similar technologies, say one mainly operates in semiconductors and the other
in ICT applications, they are not to be found very far away from one another in the
network. This implies that if any two firms are sufficiently distant in a given observed
network, their technological and cost characteristics are expected to be unrelated. In
Appendix B I explore some models of network formation, inspired by those discussed
by Graham (2015, 2017) and related ideas, that involve multi-technology firms. I il-
lustrate how Assumption 1 is implied by these models either exactly or approximately,
with low associated values of C.
8This count includes the end of the path: thus dij = 1 if gij 6= 0. For every node i, by definition
dii = 0. In undirected networks, dij = dji for every pair (i, j). Minimum path length is popularly
referred to as the “degree of separation” between any two nodes in a network.
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By specifying a vector of linear cost parameters (ξ1, . . . , ξQ) ∈ RQ++ for the Q
conventional inputs, the firm profit function (revenues minus costs) can be written as




















for any firm i = 1, . . . , N . Note that individual profits depend both on firm-specific
shocks ωi and $i, as well as on the R&D choices of firms that are connected in the
spillovers network. This in turn makes firm R&D, in equilibrium, dependent on the
shocks of other firms. Thus, any notion of equilibrium should specify an information
structure of the game. Denote as Ωi the set of shocks ω and $ observed by firm i. I
make a fairly general assumption about the structure of this set.
Assumption 2. Every firm always observes its own individual shocks: ωi, $i ∈ Ωi.
Moreover, there exists some integer L such that individual information sets do not
include the shocks of firms located at distances higher than L: (ωj, $j) /∈ Ωi if dij > L.
Assumption 2 states the obvious consideration that firms are aware of their own
circumstances (shocks ωi and $i). In addition, it specifies that for sufficiently high
distances in network space, any two firms i and j that are that far away are ignorant of
their respective shocks. In other words, this assumption rules out the case of complete
information for networks of moderate diameter, which is arguably unrealistic. More
concretely this means that the management of, say, a biotech firm is unlikely to know
– or to take into account when making business decisions – the specific circumstances
affecting a firm specialized in mechanical engineering, and vice versa.
I characterize the problem of firms’ optimal input choice as a simultaneous game
of incomplete information with the following timing.
1. Nature draws (ω,$,G) from the common knowledge distribution F (ω,$,G).
Every firm i observes the network G as well as its own information set Ωi.
2. Firms simultaneously make their R&D and conventional input choices.
3. Payoffs (profits) are paid out.
For simplicity, network connections are not treated as strategic choices. In Appendix
B I discuss a variation of this game in which, after nature has drawn (ω,$), each pair
of firms cooperatively establishes connections gij, and then individual firms choose
their inputs. As the input choice subgame remains unchanged, the model’s empirical
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predictions still hold if the network formation stage conforms to Assumption 1. This
is the case if, for dissimilar firms, the cost of establishing a link exceeds the benefit.
1.2 Equilibrium Predictions
The solution of the game is identified as a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Define an indi-
vidual strategy as a mapping from individual information sets onto valid choices of
R&D investment and conventional inputs: (Si,Xi) : Ωi 7→ (Si;Xi1, . . . , XiQ) ∈ RQ+1++
for every firm i = 1, . . . , N . Denote the vector of all other firms’ R&D strategies as
S−i = {(S1, . . . , SN) \Si} ∈ RN−1++ . A Bayes-Nash equilibrium is a profile of strategies
(S∗,X∗) = [(S∗1,X
∗














)∣∣Ωi] ≥ E [pii (Si,Xi; S∗−i)∣∣Ωi] ∀ (Si,Xi) 6= (S∗i ,X∗i )
for every firm i = 1, . . . , N . The following result characterizes the equilibrium.
Proposition 1. If
ϑ ≡ δ










there exists a unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium strategy profile which can be expressed,




q=1 βq (log βq − log ξq − log γ)
1− γ −∑Qq=1 βq b∗i (G;ϑ) + s∗i (Ωi,G) (4)
logX∗iq = logS
∗
i + log βq − log ξq − log γ +$i for q = 1, . . . , Q (5)
where b∗i (G;ϑ) is the Katz-Bonacich network measure of centrality with attenuation
factor ϑ for i = 1, . . . , N , while s∗i (Ωi,G) is a non-linear, spatially recursive function
of firm i’s information set Ωi and network topology:
s∗i (Ωi,G) =
1








gijδ · s∗j (Ωj,G)
)∣∣∣∣∣Ωi
]}
where ω˜i ≡ ωi −
(
1−∑Qq=1 βq)$i for i = 1, . . . , N .
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This result is easily interpreted. First, consider that (5) is simply a set of constant
relative input shares conditions, which is typical of the maximization of Cobb-Douglas
functions. By contrast, equilibrium R&D given in (4) can be decomposed in two parts.
The first one represents the deterministic component, for firm i, of the marginal return
of R&D. It accounts for the complementarity of private R&D with both conventional
inputs and the “certain” component of peers’ R&D, itself a function b∗i (G;ϑ) of firm i’s
position in the network. The second part represents the best equilibrium prediction
that firm i can make, on the basis of private information, on how random shocks to
both productivity and R&D costs of all firms in the network (including itself) would
alter its own net marginal return of R&D. In equilibrium, in fact, all the shocks may
affect the R&D investment of connections, which is complementary to private R&D.
The Bayes-Nash equilibrium expressed in Proposition 1 is unique for values of the
spillover parameter δ that are sufficiently small relative to the overall spillover weights
of all other firms. This condition is necessary to rule out the existence of “explosive”
equilibria in which some firms invest infinite amounts in R&D. In theory, an explosive
equilibrium could be “catalyzed” by the presence of a single, highly connected firm in
the network: due to strategic complementarities from the many connections, that one
firm would invest infinite amounts in R&D; in equilibrium however, its connections
would also do so (again because of complementarities) and so on. In practice, explosive
equilibria are not encountered in the real world, and the empirical results of this paper
are consistent with the necessary condition for uniqueness.
The next result motivates the empirical strategy of this paper.


















∣∣ dij ≤ C + 2L) 6= 0 (8)
that is, the unobserved shock of one firm and the equilibrium R&D strategy of another
one are independent as long as the two are distanced by a minimal path length higher
than C + L; similarly, the equilibrium strategies of any two firms at distance higher
than C + 2L are also independent, but may be correlated at distance C + 2L or lower.
Proposition 2 places a bound, in terms of “degrees of separation”, on the equilibrium
correlation across R&D choices and unobserved shocks in the network. The intuition
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is the following: even if in equilibrium firms endogenously internalize the shocks of
other organizations that are “sufficiently close” (up to distance L), and this in turn
amplifies the exogenous cross-correlation (up to distance C), if both mechanisms are
bounded their combined effect also is. In other words the shocks of other firms that
are “very distant” in the network, whose R&D investment is of little relevance, are
never internalized by individual firms. An implication of this result is that, for any
firm i, the R&D choices of firms that are “sufficiently distant” in the network can be
used as exogenous predictors of the R&D investment of its own direct links, which
are located at distance 1. Intuitively, the R&D of such “predicting” firms depends on
some technological and cost factors also affecting the R&D of firm i’s connections,
but not the R&D of firm i itself. Given (6), (7) and (8), the appropriate “predicting”





Graph 1: A Tetrad, or Two Semi-Overlapping Open Triads
An example of this is provided in Graph 1, which displays a network of four
firms (i, j, k, `): a tetrad. In fact, this graph is composed by two open triads9 that
partially overlap, as they share two nodes and an edge (the link between j and k).
Consider first the simplest situation in which C = 1 and L = 0. In this case, firms
only observe their private shocks, featuring spatial cross-correlation extending up to
immediate connections, but not beyond. Therefore, R&D is correlated in equilibrium
only across firms that are reciprocally connected, as it solely reflects private shocks.
Consequently, from the point of view of firm i, the R&D of firm k (S∗k) can serve
as an “exogenous predictor” of firm j’s R&D (S∗j ), because the two are correlated
but the former is independent from firm i’s R&D (S∗i ). However, the R&D of firm
9An open triad is a network (or a subset of a network) composed by three nodes; two of these
three nodes are not connected to one another, but are both connected to the third one. In Graph 1
the two semi-overlapping open triads are represented by a solid and a dashed line, respectively.
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`, (S∗` ) is not a valid predictor, as it is uncorrelated with that of firm j. Similarly,
S∗i exogenously predicts S∗j from the point of view of firm k. The same properties
symmetrically apply to the “dashed” triad made of nodes (j, k, `).
Consider now some slightly more complex cases. If C = 2 and L = 0 firms are still
unable to observe the shocks of others, but in this case the cross-correlation of R&D
extends up to two degrees of distance as it reflects the primitive cross-correlation of
the shocks. Hence, from the point of view of firm i, S∗` can act as a valid predictor
of S∗j ; symmetrically S∗i would predict S∗k for firm `. In the case where C = 0 and
L = 1 the only mechanism driving R&D cross-correlation is the endogenous reflection
of shocks, which can be observed between connected firms. Note that, in this case,
the cross-correlation of R&D extends up to two degrees of distance. In fact, observe
that both S∗i and S∗k depend on (ωj, $j). Yet, S∗k is still a valid predictor of S∗j for
firm i, as it is uncorrelated with ωi – and vice versa. Observe how S∗` also correlates
with S∗j : they are both a function of (ωk, $k). Thus, firm `’s R&D is a valid predictor
of firm i’s spillovers. The same logic applies when inverting the order of the nodes.
Finally consider the case in which C = 1 and L = 1. Observe how R&D is correlated
across the entire tetrad, but the R&D of firms at a distance of at least three degrees
of separation are still valid predictors as per (6).
The result that follows is an immediate implication of Proposition 2.
Proposition 3. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the equilibrium conventional input
choices of one firm are also uncorrelated with the equilibrium R&D of firms located






∣∣ dij > C + 2L) = 0 for q = 1, . . . , Q (9)
This result further supports the use of the R&D of firms that are distant enough
as an instrument for the R&D of direct connections. Specifically, it motivates their
exogeneity relative to other potentially endogenous control variables employed in the
empirical analysis, as long as such instruments are taken at the furthest valid distance
C + 2L + 1. The intuition is very simple: according the equilibrium conditions in
(5), R&D and conventional inputs reflect the same information a firm knows about
the state of the network. As the stochastic properties of both R&D and conventional
inputs are a function of the same information set, the same bound applies to both
relationships (7) and (9).
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2 Networks and Data
This section is divided in three parts. In the first one, I formally introduce cross-firm
measures of connection based on the underlying professional connections between the
inventor teams of any two firms. In the second part, I describe the dynamic network
of R&D spillovers calculated by measuring connections over time for each pair of firms
from a panel of US companies. In the third part, I discuss some descriptive statistics
that are relevant with respect to the empirical analysis, with a special focus on the
spatial cross-correlation of R&D in the network.
2.1 The Measures of Connection
Assume that there are three R&D intensive firms whose scientists are related to each
other even beyond the borders of their respective organizations. Denote asMi,Mj
andMk the sets of inventors belonging to each firm, withM = Mi ∪Mj ∪Mk. I
define an existing co-patenting relationship between any two elements ofM, be they
m and n, with the notation ptmn = 1. This indicates that two individuals, at time t,
share some professional collaboration on any past research project that has resulted
in a patent application featuring both their names. If such a relationship is absent, it
is ptmn = 0. One could visualize the resulting network as a graph where each element
ofM is a node, and nodes are linked by edges if p = 1.
Firm i Firm j
Firm k
Graph 2: Inventors Network Example, t = 0
Graph 2 displays the first part of a stylized example on such a co-patenting network
(hypothetically observed at some point in time t = 0). The inventors of each firm are
nodes of the network displayed with different colors: red for i, blue for j, green for k.
The co-patenting relationships p0mn are visualized as edges connecting two inventors.
The only existing cross-firm co-patenting relation is that between an inventor of firm
i and an inventor of firm k.
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The central hypothesis of this paper is that firms learn about other firms’ R&D
activities thanks to the inventors who are connected to scientists in other firms, be-
cause of continuing professional relationships or more informal channels. A natural
implication of such an assumption is that the tighter the connection is between two
R&D teams, the stronger the spillovers are that occur between two organizations. For
this reason I define measures that quantitatively capture such a differential effect. A
measure of connection cf(ij)t between, say, firm i and firm j at time t, is a monotonic
function f of the fraction of inventors of either firm who are connected to inventors
of the other firm, relative to the total size of both R&D teams:
cf(ij)t = f
(
# inv.s of i connected to j at t+ # inv.s of j connected to i at t
# inv.s of i at t+ # inv.s of j at t
)
(10)
where f : [0, 1]→ [0, 1], f (0) = 0 and f (1) = 1. These restrictions on f ensure that
measures of connection take values between 0 (no connection) and 1 (full connection)
as per the standard normalization of the strength of edges in a weighted network. For
the three firms in the example of Figure 2, cf(ij)0 = c
f
(jk)0 = 0, while c
f
(ik)0 = f (1/3).
The facts that cf(ij)t ∈ [0, 1], and that any measure of connection is symmetric
(cf(ij)t = c
f
(ji)t) bear important implications. The former means that an extra unit of
external R&D cannot be more valuable for a firm than internally performed R&D,
which is a reasonable hypothesis because in-house R&D is under direct control of
the firm’s management. The latter implicitly assumes that the spillover relationship
is symmetric between the two firms i and j, regardless of the relative size of their
R&D departments.10 In addition, it must be stressed that such a connection measure
essentially captures the relative number of personal relationships established in the
past; it is silent about the relative importance of single linkages between inventors.11
In Appendix E I characterize alternative definitions of connections which depart from
these assumptions, and I explore the implications of their use in the empirical analysis.
10This is apparent from the example in Figure 2 where the two connected firms have different size.
This assumption can have advantages: for example, it conveniently handles measurement errors in
the assignment of individual inventors to firms. It may not be the most appropriate description of
reality, however. For example, it might be that few “insiders” are enough to grasp much of another
firm’s knowledge. In such a case, the symmetric ratio in (10) would downplay spillovers received by
the smaller firm in a pair, and an “asymmetric” measure would be better suited.
11Alternatively, one can assume that relationships between inventors that are prolonged over the
years, or collaborations resulting in many joint patents, are more relevant than others. Similarly, con-
nections involving superstar inventors who issue many patents, of which some have been extremely
well cited, can be more valuable for a firm than linkages to “ordinary” inventors.
15
Connection measures between two firms can change over time. Their dynamics
are the result of conceptually different types of events that are in principle observable,
although I am not able to do so with the available data. Said events are: i. cross-firm
R&D collaborations, such as joint ventures, resulting for instance in joint patents; ii.
the movement of inventors between firms. Both situations are usually thought of as
drivers of knowledge transfer between firms, and they positively impact measures of
connection. In addition, iii. entry and exit of inventors from the network also affect
the calculated metrics. However, their net effect is ambiguous and depends on the
specific circumstances of the inventors in the process in question.12
Firm i Firm j
Firm k
Graph 3: Inventors Network Example, t = 1
Graph 3 extends the previous example by advancing one time period to t = 1, and
examining the consequences of various changes in the underlying network of past
patent collaborations. New linkages between inventors, due to newly appearing joint
patents, are represented by dashed lines. In period t = 1 some incumbent inventors
of firm j have been observed to patent jointly with researchers from firm k, including
an entrant inventor from that company. A new entrant in firm i, not connected to
anyone elsewhere, has also appeared. Instead, among firm i’s incumbents one inventor
has now moved to j, while the one who used to maintain the connection with firm k
has exited the network. As a result, cf(ij)1 = f (1/4), c
f
(jk)1 = f (1/2) and c
f
(ik)1 = 0.




# inv.s of i connected to j at t+ # inv.s of j connected to i at t
# inv.s of i at t+ # inv.s of j at t
(11)
This choice responds to a precise economic assumption. The typical anecdotal narra-
12New entrants increase the denominator of (10), but can also generate new cross-firm linkages,
tightening connections. Similarly, the exit of scientists can decrease the denominator of (10), as well
as the numerator if the leaving inventors were playing the role of connecting firms to each other.
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tive on technological spillovers usually involves some solitary individual who transfers,
perhaps by mistake, much of the knowledge internally developed by one firm to some
of its partners or competitors. The very expression “spillovers” is verbally associated
in such anecdotes to the “leakage” of few accumulating “drops” of knowledge. By ap-
plying the square root function to the ratio of connected inventors, I attribute more
importance to the pairs of firms with relatively fewer connections. In the remainder
of this paper I use the expression “connection” to indicate the squared root metric.
In Appendix E I present the empirical results from applying alternative definitions of
connections based on different choices of f .
2.2 Firm-level Network
In the empirical analysis I combine different data sources. The firm-level network is
constructed from the data assembled by Bloom et al. (henceforth BSV) for their cited
study. This is an unbalanced panel13 consisting of 736 mostly manufacturing, R&D-
intensive firms listed on the US stock market, observed over the years 1976-2001. The
BSV dataset combines accounting data from COMPUSTAT, firm-level patent counts,
as well as Jaffe-type measures used by BSV to disentangle different types of spillover
effects. Via firm and patent identifiers, I match the BSV data to the “disambiguated”
patent dataset by Li et al. (2014). The latter provides unique identifiers for individual
inventors across different patents, thanks to a disambiguation algorithm that exploits
information available in the USPTO database. Ultimately, this results in the selection
of 1,315,060 patents granted to 565,019 inventors.
To calculate the connection measures, I need to associate inventors to each other
as well as to firms. The first task is accomplished by looking at jointly filed patents.
Specifically, for two inventors m and n, I assign ptmn = 1 if at time t+ 1 the USPTO
has received at least one patent application (to be eventually granted) filed at any
time in the past by both inventors. The implicit assumption is that the two inventors
are involved in a professional relationship at least one year prior to the application.14
Similarly, in order to assign inventors to firms one has to extrapolate facts on the basis
13The panel is unbalanced because of the entry and exit of firms, as they go public or are subject
to mergers and acquisitions (see the description in BSV’s appendix). The average length of the panel
is 17.8 years.
14Given the lag structure of R&D outcomes (patents) it is likely that this is an overly restrictive
assumption. On the other hand, it is desirable to avoid assigning relationships that did not exist in
reality. The results are very robust to perturbations of this assignment rule.
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of limited available information. I use the sequence of patents co-filed by inventor m
and assigned to firm i in order to define a time interval in which one can reasonably
presume that the individual was crucial for the R&D activity of that organization.
The details of the assignment rule are provided in Appendix C.
I calculate measure (11) for each pair of firms and for every year from 1981 to 2001,
using patents granted since 1976. As calculating connections requires the observation
of enough antecedent patents, I abstain from doing it for 1976-1980; since the BSV
panel is thin in those years this is a small loss. In total 460 firms display at least one
positive connection with another firm in any year of the time interval under analysis.
The number of firms that are actually connected in any year varies over time: some
of the initially unconnected firms would eventually develop bonds. Conversely, firms
that are already connected in 1981 may experience variations in the number of their
connections (possibly resulting in the loss of all of them), or leave the sample. Thus,
one never observes all the 460 firms of the dynamic network in each cross section.
Figure 1: Firms, Connected Firms and Average Connections over time
Figure 1 portrays, for every year from 1981 to 2001, the overall number of firms
in the original panel (blue dashed line), the number of those displaying any nonzero
connection (blue continuous line), as well as the average number of connections per
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firm, both in the whole sample and for the subset of “connected” firms (red dashed and
continuous lines, respectively). Figure 1 displays a steady increase in the number of
connected firms between 1981 and 1998, followed by a drop from 1998 to 2001 – partly
because of attrition in the original panel, which is particularly severe in later years.
Among connected firms, the average number of connections increases steadily over
the entire time frame.15 By construction, this is also reflected by the “unconditional”
average represented by the dashed red line. Another way to appreciate the temporal
evolution of the network is to visualize it in the form of graphs; selected graphs for
the years 1985, 1990, 1995 and 2000 are reported in Appendix D.
Figure 2: Degree distribution over time (connected firms)
Figure 2 summarizes the yearly distributions in the number of connections per firm
(called “degree”) of connected firms. Like in most networks, the degree distribution
is very asymmetric; moreover it tends to widen over time. The most connected firms
go from less than 10 links in the early 80s to but several dozens of them by the year
2000, while the median number of connections only increases from 1 to 5. Connections
15This increase can be attributed to several factors, for example: the mechanical effect due to the
overall increase in the number of patents over the two decades, the diffusion of R&D joint ventures,
and the emergence of collaborations between universities and firms, linking inventors from various
firms together. More informative patent data are necessary to distinguish between these mechanisms.
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themselves are also asymmetrically distributed, as shown by Figure 3 (however, their
distribution looks quite stable over time). The average of g(ij)t is 0.083, with 0.066
standard deviation.16 A measure useful for interpreting the empirical results is the
row sum of connections, that is the sum of all of one firm’s connections in one year:
g¯it =
∑
j 6=i g(ij)t. Among connected firms, the mean and standard deviation of g¯it are
respectively 0.50 and 0.57. The yearly empirical distribution of g¯it, not shown for
brevity, spreads out over time mirroring the dynamics of the degree distribution.
Figure 3: Distribution of the connections (g(ij)t) over time
Figure 4 displays the temporal evolution of the Triad Census, namely the total
count of open and closed triads.17 Between years 1981 and 2001, one counts in total
160,365 open triads and 15,623 closed triads; the latter are about 10% of the former.
The number of both types of triads grows over time in analogy with average degree.
The preponderance of open triads indicates that the network does not feature an ex-
cessive degree of clustering for the purpose of this article’s empirical strategy. If most
triads were closed, in fact, it would not be possible to identify “indirect connections”
16Recall that this refers to the squared-root connection measure as defined in (11). The average
for baseline linear measure is 0.012, with 0.028 standard deviation.
17In analogy with the definition of open triad, a closed triad is a (sub)network whose three nodes
are all connected to one another.
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(other firms located at distance 2 or higher) for many firms in the network.
Figure 4: Triad Census
2.3 Summary Statistics and Spatial Correlation
In Table 1 I report some firm-level summary statistics. To this end I split the sample
into five groups: one for the firms that never enter the network, and four groups for
those that do. Specifically, I calculate the overall sum of connections for each firm as
g¯i =
∑
t g¯it, and I assign each firm to a group on the basis of its classification within
quartiles of g¯i. Quartile 1 contains the least connected firms in the network over the
time interval; while quartile 4 contains the most connected ones. For each of these
groups, I report the mean and standard deviation of specific variables by pooling all
years in the sample. In addition to real sales Yit, other outcome measures (Tobin’s q,
citation-weighted patents Pit) and number of employees Eit, I also report – for easier
interpretation – the ratio of Yit to several input or spillover measures. Finally, the last
row reports the ratio of Yit on the connections-based spillover component of knowledge
capital, that is the main independent variable of the analysis. Table 1 highlights the
fact that firms inside the network – in particular the most connected among them –
are larger, more R&D intensive and more productive than those outside of of it.
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Network 1 2 3 4
Yit: Sales (Millions 1996$) 751 1066 1383 2172 10462
(3792) (2357) (2504) (4533) (20058)
Vit/Ait: Tobin’s q 1.886 1.885 2.573 2.734 3.410
(2.031) (1.839) (3.080) (3.306) (4.118)
Pit: Patent Stock (cit. weighted) 7.453 16.09 24.65 74.03 652.0
(48.17) (44.75) (50.91) (143.8) (1322.1)
Eit: Employees (Thousands) 4.068 6.940 9.328 12.40 57.09
(12.52) (15.80) (16.63) (22.43) (96.80)
Yit/Eit: Labor Productivity 135.6 134.5 157.1 156.5 192.4
(80.06) (106.6) (95.43) (117.7) (153.3)
Yit/Kit: Capital Productivity 6.932 5.308 5.142 4.941 4.184
(6.083) (3.167) (3.992) (3.292) (2.883)
Yit/R&Dit 39.31 19.71 51.10 11.12 4.342
(134.1) (70.47) (479.9) (34.46) (3.932)
Yit/ Jaffe Measure (i, t) 80.28 107.7 140.0 211.6 962.5





jt 953.9 846.2 577.6 198.9
(2224.0) (1762.1) (1858.7) (1339.6)
No. of Observations 4363 1854 1819 1949 2028
Notes: The table is divided in five columns: one for firms in the BSV sample that are never
part of the network, and four for each quartile of g¯i. The four quartile groups contain different
numbers of observations because of panel attrition. R&Dit denotes the R&D stock of firm i
in year t. All descriptive statistics are calculated by pooling observations over years; means
and standard deviations (in parentheses) are reported.
In light of the empirical strategy adopted in the paper, an important set of de-
scriptive statistics that is worth examining is the empirical spatial cross-correlation
of R&D between firms in the network. This is reported in Figure 5 in the form of
the Moran’s I statistic, which is calculated for both R&D flows and R&D stocks
across different degrees of separation (distances) in the network. Moran’s I statistic,
a standard tool in spatial analysis, consistently estimates the spatial correlation of
a given variable of interest at a given level of distance (Kelejian and Prucha, 2001).
I perform the calculation by pooling together all pairs of firms at the same level of
distance throughout all the years. Figure 5 illustrates a strong correlation for direct
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connections (distance 1), a correlation of half strength for indirect links (distance 2)
and zero correlation for all further distances: this is a typical pattern encountered
in many other real-world networks (Christakis and Fowler, 2013). The correlation of
R&D stocks is mechanically weaker than the one of R&D flows, as it accounts for
past time periods when two firms were not connected.
Figure 5: Spatial Correlogram of R&D Measures, 1981-2001
According to the analytical framework of the paper, the spatial cross-correlation of
R&D reflects the exogenous cross-correlation of firm-specific characteristics (ωi, $i),
the endogenous strategic dependence between firms’ R&D choices, or both. In light
of Proposition 2, the evidence in Figure 5 is compatible either with a situation where
(C,L) = (0, 1) or one in which (C,L) = (2, 0) (this is analogous to the analysis of
time series correlograms generated by MA-types of processes). In the former case,
the R&D of firms located at either distance 2 or at distance 3 are valid predictors of
direct connections’ R&D. In the latter, only indirect links at distance 3 can function
as appropriate predictors. Consequently, in the empirical analysis I experiment with
instruments constructed by aggregating the R&D stocks of indirect connections at
both levels of distance. Instruments based on higher distances present no correlation
with the R&D of direct connections, as evidenced by Figure 5.
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3 Econometric Model
This section concerns the empirical methodology of this article, and it is divided in
four parts. In the first one, I discuss the workhorse model for the evaluation of R&D
spillovers on productivity effects: an augmented production function. In the second
part I describe the empirical strategy for addressing endogeneity. In the third part I
introduce models for the estimation of spillovers on firms’ market value and innovation
rate. Finally, in the fourth and last part I illustrate the clustering approach for the
calculation of standard errors, which is common to all empirical models.
3.1 Production Function
The workhorse empirical model of the empirical analysis is an augmented production
function. It is the empirical counterpart of equation (2) adapted to panel data:
log Yit = αi +
Q∑
q=1
βq logXitq + γ logSit + δ
N∑
j=1
g(ij)t logSjt + τt + υit (12)
where the unobserved shock ωit, which is now allowed to vary across firms and over
time, is decomposed as ωit = αi+τt+υit, that is by a firm-invariant effect (αi), a year
effect (τt), and finally a residual error term (υit). Here Sjt denotes the R&D stock of
firm j at time t, and g(ij)t is the connection measure between firms i and j at time
t, with g(ii)t = 0 for all i and for all t. The R&D stock Sit is constructed, following
a customary approach in the literature, as the depreciated sum of past expenditures
on R&D up to year t− 1 (Griliches, 1998).18 To account for the known fact that the
innovation and productivity effects of R&D materialize with a temporal lag, current
expenditures in R&D are excluded from the calculation of the yearly stock.
Parameter δ represents the overall strength of the R&D spillovers in the network.
It is interpreted as the elasticity of a connection-weighted neighbor’s R&D on firm
productivity. It is useful for different kinds of thought experiments: for example, a
firm i connected to a neighbor j with connection gij = 0.4 receives a 0.4δ percentage
increase in productivity following a 1% increase in the R&D stock of firm j. Similarly,
a firm with row sum of connections g¯it = 4 benefits from a 4δ percentage increase in
18In the BSV dataset the R&D stock is constructed, like in other studies, by applying the perpetual
inventory method with a 15% depreciation rate. The R&D stock measure employed in this analysis
reads as Sit = Ri(t−1) + .85Si(t−1), where Rit is the flow of R&D investment at time t.
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productivity following a 1% rise in the research effort of all its neighbors. By contrast,
parameter γ measures the elasticity of firm productivity with respect to changes in
the private (in-house) R&D stock.
Since actual physical quantity Yit is not observed in the BSV dataset, I proxy it
by the deflated sales of firm i in year t, as it is customary in studies dealing with the
estimation of production functions. Deflated sales, however, conflate both supply and
demand factors. To control for the latter, like BSV I include in the specification of (12)
some industry-level market outcomes, namely current and lagged industry sales, and
current industry prices. In addition to demand side controls and conventional inputs
(capital and labor in year t), I also include other R&D spillover variables on the right-
hand side of (12). Their purpose is to more convincingly restrict the interpretation of
δ to the sole effect of other firms’ R&D induced through the collaboration network.
For simplicity, in expression (12) I do not explicitly distinguish between conventional
inputs and other demand or spillover controls; with some abuse of notation I treat all
of these as different elements of the set of covariates {Xitq}Qq=1.
The additional R&D spillover variables deserve further elaboration. Two of them
are the key regressors of the BSV study: Jaffe’s classical measure of (beneficial) R&D
spillovers, and BSV’s original measure of “business stealing,” which aims at capturing
the negative externality in terms of residual demand that is due to market rivals’ R&D.
Both are constructed weighing external R&D Sj by some metric of similarity between
firm j and a reference firm i: the correlation of patent technological classes in the case
of Jaffe’s measure, and that of sales’ allocation across sectors for the BSV business
stealing measure. In addition, I include one spillover variable which accounts for the
geographic co-location of firms’ R&D, so to control for the possibility that connections
g(ij)t simply capture firms’ spatial proximity and other spatially correlated factors. To
construct this measure, I weigh external R&D by a measure of proximity analogous
to (11): the square root of the relative proportion of two firms’ inventors who reside
in the same statistical metropolitan area (CBSA). Appendix C provides additional
details and descriptive statistics about this “Geographic Spillovers” measure.
3.2 Endogeneity and Instrumental Variables
The estimation of δ in equation (12) suffers from two potential endogeneity problems.
The first is the possible presence of common confounders driving both R&D choices
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and productivity for connected firms, corresponding to the correlated effects as per
the analysis by Manski (1993) of spillovers in the classroom. Formally, if for any two
connected firms i and j both E [υitυjt] 6= 0 and E [logSit · υit] 6= 0 hold simultaneously,
it follows that E [logSjt · υit] 6= 0 and OLS estimates of δ are inconsistent. In the pro-
duction function context, this is a spatial generalization of the classical “transmission
bias” due to unobserved shocks. The second problem is endogeneity of connections:
the possibility that firms differ in their propensity to establish connections as a func-
tion of their unobserved shocks (E
[
g(ij)tυit
] 6= 0 for at least some connection j). For
example, it is likely that highly prolific, well connected inventors are more inclined to
move towards more productive firms.19
The analysis conducted in Section 1 suggests a strategy to address both problems
at the same time: to predict the R&D of a firm’s direct connections with the R&D of
other firms that are “sufficiently” distant in the network. For two appropriate firms i
and k, equation (6) from Proposition 2 can be recast in a panel data setting as:20
E
[
logSkt · υit|hD(ik)t = 1
]
= 0 (13)




is a dummy variable indicating that firms i and k are
located, in year t, at a given distance C +L+ 1 ≤ D ≤ C + 2L+ 1. Because of (13),
by iterating expectations one gets:
E
[
hD(ik)t logSkt · υit
]
= 0 (14)
which is a valid and relevant moment condition for the identification of δ, as Equation
(8) from Proposition 2 also guarantees that the instrument correlates with the R&D
of some of firm i’s direct connections.
The econometrics of moment condition (14) deserves more discussion. Intuitively,
the reason why (14) addresses the common shocks problem is that for appropriate
D, logSkt is generated by some variation that is independent of υit. Moreover (14) is
19In such a situation it is unclear whether the resulting bias would be positive, because moving
inventors link together both high- and low-productivity firms.
20Firms accumulate R&D stock (knowledge capital) over time. In Appendix B I discuss conditions
under which Proposition 2 can be extended to a dynamic model. In particular, it is necessary that
the network tends to become denser instead of sparser (intuitively, if distances are lengthened (13)
might not hold, because both logSkt and υit would preserve the memory of past linkages). Moreover,
if errors are serially correlated and firms do not pre-commit to long term R&D plans, firms must be
unable to observe past R&D choices of sufficiently distant firms (“finite spatial memory”).
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also robust to network endogeneity because direct connections g(ij)t, which are likely
to depend on υit, are simply absent from the expression of the moment. Therefore,
identification of δ is obtained through variation of external R&D which is “as good
as exogenous”; within this framework, taking the network as given is innocuous. It is
useful to draw a parallel between this approach and GMM methods that are typical
of the dynamic panel literature (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995;
Blundell and Bond, 1998). In the latter, following a transformation of the model aimed
at removing fixed effects, endogenous lagged variables of interest are instrumented by
“sufficiently past” further lags. Similarly, here I instrument the possibly endogenous
first spatial lag of R&D by “sufficiently distant” farther spatial lags of R&D.
In terms of practical implementation, it must be noted that it is generally possible
to find – for each firm i – multiple other firms k located at distance D. Each of them
corresponds to a moment condition expressible as (14); all of these moments can be
empirically operationalized in different ways, for example as independent conditions in
a GMM problem.21 However, in this analysis I opt for a simple approach: I aggregate
all those moment conditions linearly, taking the summation of (14) over all firms in








which amounts to selecting the log-R&D of all “indirectly connected” firms k located
at distance D, giving each an equal weight in the summation. As I illustrate in the
next section, in order to identify δ I employ moment condition (12) and variations of
it in both simple IV-2SLS and System GMM estimates of the production function.
This still leaves the question about the appropriate value of D to be chosen for
estimation open. The previous discussion of Figure 5 suggests selecting “indirect links”
located at both distances 2 or 3, or just distance 3. It is important to discuss how the
choice of D relates to the data employed in the analysis. For moment condition (15)
to be credible, it is necessary that such values of D be large enough to separate out
firms with different unobservables. In fact, firms from the BSV sample are large multi-
business, multi-technology companies, presenting only weak correlation between their
patent and product portfolios (see the description in their article). Therefore, while
21In this case, it would be interesting to analyze how the optimal GMM weighting matrix varies
as a function of network topology. This is an intriguing topic for further research.
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two connected firms are likely to share some characteristics, they are also expected to
be different in other respects. Since any spatial cross-correlation that is stronger at
low distances must mechanically decay at higher distances, it is likely that common
similarities are at best negligible at distance 3. This argument provides an empirical
rationale for the indirect evidence given in Figure 5 and the choice of D = 3.
3.3 Additional Outcomes
In empirical studies of R&D spillovers, it is customary to assess the effect of other
firms’ R&D not only on output or productivity, but also on other outcomes and
indicators of firm performance and innovation rate. In his seminal study, Jaffe (1986)
also measured the effect of spillovers on firms’ market value and patent output. BSV
follow in his legacy. Under their shared theoretical framework, especially under the
maintained hypothesis of R&D as a strategic complement, spillovers stimulate R&D
efforts and increase the number and quality of inventions. The effects on productivity
can be both indirect (thanks to new or better patents/products) and direct (because
of the immediate applicability of spilled knowledge within the production process).
This ultimately results in better firm performance and increased market value.
I follow suit and measure the effect of the R&D performed by “connections” on
outcomes other than output or productivity by extending the empirical specifications
by BSV. Their market value specification is a standard semi-logarithmic Tobin’s q












g(ij)t logSjt + τ˜t + υ˜it (16)
where Vit is the market value of a firm measured at time t and Ait is the replacement
value of its assets. The set of controls {Witq}Q˜q=1 includes a sixth degree polynomial of
the ratio Si(t+1)/Kit to control for differences in R&D intensity,22 current and lagged
industry-level sales, as well as the three additional spillover variables (Jaffe’s, BSV’s
business stealing, and the geographic measure). Since this is a linear model, I address
endogeneity through the same IV strategy outlined above for the production function.
22In semi-logarithmic Tobin’s q models, a higher degree polynomial of S/K is a customary ap-
proximation to some unknown non-linear function of the R&D stock to capital ratio. Note that the
R&D stock is taken at year t+ 1: like BSV, I let market value depend on current R&D investment,
as investors may price in the future expected return of R&D.
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The effect of connections’ R&D on firms’ innovation rate is estimated instead via




β˘qZitq + γ˘ logSit + δ˘
N∑
j=1
g(ij)t logSjt + τ˘t + υ˘it
 (17)
which, to account for values of Pit = 0, is specified as a negative binomial model and
estimated via maximum likelihood (Hausman et al., 1984; Blundell et al., 1995).23 The
set of controls {Zitq}Q˘q=1 includes a term for the lagged dependent variable (logPi(t−1))
as well as the three extra spillover variables. To address endogeneity in a non-linear
model I adapt my IV strategy to a control function approach. Specifically, I regress
the endogenous variables on the excluded instruments and the other controls, and I
include sixth-degree polynomials of the resulting residuals into (17).
3.4 Standard Errors
It is important to consider that the cross-correlation across unobserved shocks inval-
idates standard asymptotic properties of any GMM/2SLS or MLE estimator. As a
theory of heteroscedasticity-autocorrelation consistent (HAC) estimators in the case
of network dependence has not been developed yet, I adopt a transparent clustering
approach that is consistent across both linear and non-linear models.24 Specifically,
I follow Bester, Conley, and Hansen (2011), who argue that even in presence of weak
dependence between groups, a clustering covariance estimator (CCE) of the estimates’
variance would make for valid inferences (provided that some regularity conditions
hold and that small sample corrections are applied).25 This is particularly important
with large networks, because if the structure of cross-node dependence is unknown,
23To guarantee convergence of the estimation algorithm, it is convenient not to include firm-specific
fixed effects. I introduce four-digits industry fixed effects instead, that are indexed by s.
24For spatial data, the standard HAC procedure is the one proposed by Conley (1999), originally
conceived for cross-sectional data distributed on a regular lattice defined by a system of coordinates
(like locations on a map). However, networks are inherently multidimensional, and actual network
data may feature competing notions of distance. Thus, an extension of Conley’s HAC procedure to
networks is not straightforward. In addition, in the context examined in this paper the data are likely
to display both spatial and serial correlation, which would result in very complicated Bartlett-like
HAC estimators. A clustering approach is well suited to simultaneously address both issues.
25In their simulations, Bester, Conley, and Hansen (2011) show that in both cases of time series and
spatial dependence, tests based on Bartlett-like HAC estimates of the variance tend to incorrectly
reject relevant null hypotheses considerably more often than tests based on their CCE approach.
This difference is particularly pronounced in the case of spatial dependence.
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any partition of a network into different clusters would result in some cross-cluster
dependence. Bester et al. advocate using as few and as large clusters as possible.
I divide the network into “communities” or clusters by running the “Louvain algo-
rithm” (Blondel et al., 2008) on the “pooled” network that is obtained by summing the
same edges over the time series. The Louvain algorithm is a popular tool in network
analysis used to identify hierarchies of “communities” or clusters. At every level of
the hierarchy, connections are dense within groups and sparse between groups. The
algorithm can be fine-tuned by varying the “resolution parameter” ϕ which selects
different levels of the hierarchy.26 To strike a balance between the CCE approach by
Bester et al. and standard practices of clustering standard errors, I set ϕ = 0.6 so to
obtain 20 clusters. Because of serial correlation, all observations of the same firm in
the panel enter the same cluster; for estimates that include firms outside the network,
each of these constitutes an additional cluster. Appendix D provides a visualization of
cluster assignment. Statistical inferences are not substantially altered by the average
size or number of clusters.
4 Empirical Results
In this section I present the empirical results of the paper. This section is divided in
five parts. In the first part I present the baseline (OLS) estimates of the production
function. In the second part, I discuss the results obtained from the proposed IV and
System GMM strategies aimed at addressing endogeneity. In the third part I present
the results for the firm value equation; in the fourth those for the patent count model.
Finally, in the fifth part I discuss the economic relevance of the estimated effects.
4.1 Production Function, OLS
Table 2 displays the results from the estimation of equation (12). Across all estimates
I take both firm and year fixed effects; and I cluster standard errors according to the
approach based on network “communities” outlined above. Along with the estimate of
γ and δ I report those for Capital and Labor. The estimate of spillovers δˆ = 0.016 from
column (1) can be interpreted in light of different thought experiments. For example,
26A large value of ϕ defines a partition of few large communities; smaller values of ϕ break down
these clusters and define smaller groups by moving down the hierarchy.
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the quantity δˆg(ij)t represents the elasticity of output with respect to a 1% increase
in the R&D stock of another firm with connection g(ij)t. In the case of an average
connection g(ij)t = 0.083, the implied elasticity is 0.0013. Hypothesizing instead a 1%
increase in the R&D stock of all of one firm’s neighbors, the implied effect on firm
i’s output is a δˆg¯it% rise. For a firm connected to the network with average row-sum
g¯it = 0.50, this corresponds to a 0.008% increase. The estimated elasticity of private
R&D, γˆ = 0.045, appears in comparison to be one order of magnitude larger.
Table 2: Production Function, Ordinary Least Squares Estimates, 1981-2001
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Private R&D (γ) 0.0455∗∗∗ 0.0438∗∗∗ 0.0568∗∗∗ 0.0554∗∗∗ 0.0515∗∗∗
(0.0108) (0.0105) (0.0118) (0.0128) (0.0142)
R&D Spillovers (δ) 0.0159∗∗∗ 0.0147∗∗∗ 0.0114∗∗∗ 0.0118∗∗∗ 0.0116∗∗∗
(0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0028)
Geographic Spillovers 0.0035 0.0027 0.0023 0.0015
(0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0019)
Capital 0.2071∗∗∗ 0.2061∗∗∗ 0.2035∗∗∗ 0.2020∗∗∗ 0.2023∗∗∗
(0.0143) (0.0145) (0.0194) (0.0213) (0.0198)
Labor 0.6550∗∗∗ 0.6580∗∗∗ 0.6634∗∗∗ 0.6613∗∗∗ 0.6622∗∗∗
(0.0241) (0.0249) (0.0351) (0.0359) (0.0363)
Jaffe Tech. Proximity 0.1352∗∗ 0.0361 0.0026 0.0179
(0.0581) (0.0583) (0.0766) (0.0805)
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES
Only Network NO NO YES YES YES
No. of Communities
(Community × Year Effects) 0 0 0 10 20
No. of Observations 12503 12503 7607 7607 7607
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates of model (12). Columns 1 and 2 are estimated over the
entire original sample of 736 firms in the time interval 1981-2001. Estimates in columns 3, 4 and
5 restrict the sample to firms with at least one nonzero connection (g(ij)t 6= 0) in any year t; all
observations of these firms are also included for years with no connections. All estimates include
firm and year fixed effects. Columns 4 and 5 include additional community-by-year fixed effects,
where communities are obtained via the Louvain algorithm with ϕ = 0.8 (10 communities) in
column 4 and ϕ = 0.6 (20 communities) in column 5. Standard errors are clustered by the 20
“communities” obtained via the Louvain algorithm with ϕ = 0.6 (small sample corrections are
applied). All observations of the same individual firm in different years enter the same cluster.
For estimates not restricted to the network, firms outside the network constitute single clusters.
Asterisks denote conventional significance levels of t-tests (∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01).
Relative to column (1), in (2) I show the effect of controlling for the Jaffe measure
of knowledge spillovers based on technological proximity, as well as for the geographic
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R&D intensity measure. The inclusion of both does not dramatically impact the point
estimate δˆ, which falls to about 0.015 while remaining statistically significant. The
geographic control, on the other hand, seems to have very little economic significance.
To control for the possibility that the estimate δˆ is driven by persistent productivity
differences between firms that belong to the network and those that do not, in column
(3) I report estimates restricted to the subsample of firms that enter the network at
any point in time. This exercise has an interesting implication: while parameter δˆ is
estimated substantially smaller (down to 0.011) yet still statistically significant, the
coefficient for the Jaffe measure of spillovers falls more sharply becoming no longer
statistically significant.27 As firms that do not belong to the network are the smallest
and least R&D-intensive ones, this result implies that the positive correlation between
real sales and the Jaffe measure is largely driven by small firms patenting in the most
R&D-intensive technological fields.28
In estimates (4) and (5) I also include an additional set of dummy variables, in an
initial attempt to control for the fact that connected firms may be subject to similar
shocks. Specifically, I absorb community-by-year effects, where communities are con-
structed by applying the Louvain algorithm with varying resolution parameters. In
particular, in column (4) I employ a network partition of 10 communities (ϕ = 0.8);
while in column (5) the additional dummy variables are based on the same 20 com-
munities also used for clustering standard errors (ϕ = 0.6). Increasing the number of
clusters does not dramatically affect the point estimate δˆ. This suggests that the cor-
relation between the connections-induced measure of spillovers and one firm’s output
is in fact driven by the variation in the R&D stock of that firm’s linkages.
4.2 Production Function, IV and GMM
I now illustrate the empirical results from the application of the IV strategy aimed at
addressing correlated confounders and network endogeneity. I instrument the R&D
stock of one firm’s direct connections by aggregating the R&D of its “indirect con-
27In the analysis by BSV, their “business stealing” measure has no significant effect on productivity.
28This finding can be interpreted as a sample selection bias. COMPUSTAT only reports data for
public firms; small firms going public are usually successful firms, and those that “make it into the
news” are typically from fast developing high-tech sectors (and being in the news is itself endogenous).
If a correlation exists between the Jaffe measure and the probability that small firms go public, this
would be reflected in a positive bias in the estimate of the Jaffe measure when small public firms
are included in the estimation sample. This issue certainly deserves further attention.
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nections” located at distance 2 and 3. In light of the theoretical analysis and of the
evidence on the spatial autocorrelation of R&D in the network presented in Figure 5,
both instruments could be valid in principle. However, the farther instrument con-
structed at distance D = 3 is more likely to be uncorrelated with both unobserved
factors and the other input variables of firm i.
Table 3: Production Function, First Stage Estimates, 1981-2001
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Distance 2 Instrument 0.0043∗∗∗ 0.0044∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Distance 3 Instrument -0.0001∗ 0.0006∗∗∗ 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0005∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Private R&D 0.1598∗∗∗ 0.1774∗∗∗ 0.5022∗∗∗ 0.4612∗∗∗ 0.4357∗∗∗
(0.0517) (0.0488) (0.1463) (0.1436) (0.1504)
Capital 0.1827 0.1895 0.6169∗∗ 0.5903∗∗ 0.5923∗∗
(0.1133) (0.1098) (0.2622) (0.2719) (0.2746)
Labor -0.0761 -0.0530 -0.6482∗∗ -0.6021∗∗ -0.6541∗∗
(0.0921) (0.0913) (0.2412) (0.2636) (0.2631)
Jaffe Tech. Proximity 1.8439∗∗∗ 1.8224∗∗∗ 3.3663∗∗ 3.2740∗∗ 3.3672∗∗
(0.4808) (0.5123) (1.5953) (1.3777) (1.4690)
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES
Only Network YES YES YES YES YES
No. of Communities
(Community × Year Effects) 0 0 0 10 20
F -statistic 255.17 219.47 24.92 32.06 19.18
No. of Observations 7607 7607 7607 7607 7607
Notes: The table reports OLS “first stage” regressions of the spillover variable
∑
j 6=i g(ij)t logSjt
on selected instruments and all other right-hand side variables included in the regressions from
Table 2. The sample is restricted to firms with at least one nonzero connection (g(ij)t 6= 0) in any
year t; all observations of these firms are also included for years with no connections. Columns 1
and 2 include, on the right hand side, the distance 2 instrument; columns 2 through 5 include the
distance 3 instrument. All estimates include firm and year fixed effects. Columns 4 and 5 include
additional community-by-year fixed effects, where communities are obtained via the Louvain
algorithm with ϕ = 0.8 (10 communities) in column 4 and ϕ = 0.6 (20 communities) in column 5.
Standard errors are clustered by the 20 “communities” obtained via the Louvain algorithm with
ϕ = 0.6 (small sample corrections are applied). All observations of the same individual firm in
different years enter the same cluster. Asterisks denote conventional significance levels of t-tests
(∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01).
In Table 3 I report the results of various first stage regressions associated with
model (12). All estimates are restricted to the subsample formed by those firms that
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ever enter the network. I regress the network-based spillovers variable on the aggre-
gated log R&D stock of indirect connections located at either distance 2 (column 1),
distance 2 and distance 3 (column 2), distance 3 only (column 3). The estimates
from columns (4) and (5) are analogous to those in column (3), but they additionally
include community-by-year fixed effects (respectively based on 10 and 20 communi-
ties, in analogy with Table 2). Noticeably, both instruments are strongly, positively
correlated with the endogenous spillover variable. The measured F -statistics across
all first stage estimates are reassuringly high: the lowest F -statistic is larger than 19.
As expected, the correlation between the R&D of direct connections and the R&D
of distance 2 indirect links appears much larger (by about one order of magnitude)
than the analogous correlation with the R&D of distance 3 indirect connections.29
Table 4 displays the results from the 2SLS estimates which correspond, column-
by-column, to the first stage regressions reported in Table 3. I focus the discussion on
the parameter of interest δ. By instrumenting the spillover variable with the R&D of
indirect connections located at distance 2 (column 1), δ is estimated at around 0.013,
a figure slightly larger than the corresponding OLS estimate. When including both
instruments (column 2) the result is again similar. By instrumenting only for the R&D
of indirect connections located at distance 3 (column 3), the result is instead different:
the point estimate of δ is substantially higher, hovering around 0.020. Interestingly,
the inclusion of community-by-year effects results in even larger estimates: δˆ ' 0.023
with 10 communities (column 4) and δˆ ' 0.021 with 20 communities (column 5). All
estimates of δ are statistically significant at the 5% level. The parameters associated
with the other variables are estimated similarly with respect to the OLS case.
A possible concern about these results is that because the other input variables
(capital, labor, private R&D) are also endogenous, the corresponding elasticities may
be estimated incorrectly, thus affecting the IV estimates of δ. Recall that Proposition
3 from the analytical framework ensures that, if D = C + 2L + 1, the instrument is
also uncorrelated with the set of estimated inputs, which would result in consistent
estimates of δ. However, this may not hold in practice for all eligible distances D. To
29These first stage regressions are appropriate linear projections for the sake of 2SLS estimation,
but do not provide consistent estimates of the patterns of spatial correlation of R&D. In fact, OLS
is by construction an inconsistent estimator of any spatially autoregressive model. This may explain
why the coefficient associated with the distance 3 instrument is estimated negative and statistically
significant at the 10% level in column (2), while it is is not significantly different from zero in the
corresponding reduced form regression reported in Appendix E. Moran’s I statistic is the appropriate
means for consistent estimation of spatial correlation patterns.
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Table 4: Production Function, Two Stages Least Squares Estimates, 1981-2001
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Private R&D (γ) 0.0560∗∗∗ 0.0562∗∗∗ 0.0510∗∗∗ 0.0489∗∗∗ 0.0464∗∗∗
(0.0117) (0.0118) (0.0111) (0.0127) (0.0131)
R&D Spillovers (δ) 0.0127∗∗∗ 0.0125∗∗∗ 0.0204∗∗ 0.0230∗∗ 0.0211∗∗
(0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0084) (0.0088) (0.0095)
Geographic Spillovers 0.0027 0.0027 0.0030 0.0026 0.0018
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0021) (0.0018)
Capital 0.2025∗∗∗ 0.2027∗∗∗ 0.1969∗∗∗ 0.1944∗∗∗ 0.1956∗∗∗
(0.0200) (0.0199) (0.0225) (0.0244) (0.0234)
Labor 0.6642∗∗∗ 0.6640∗∗∗ 0.6692∗∗∗ 0.6677∗∗∗ 0.6685∗∗∗
(0.0357) (0.0356) (0.0373) (0.0382) (0.0392)
Jaffe Tech. Proximity 0.0314 0.0324 0.0041 -0.0364 -0.0167
(0.0549) (0.0553) (0.0545) (0.0669) (0.0744)
Spillovers IV(s) D = 2 D = 2, 3 D = 3 D = 3 D = 3
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES
Only Network YES YES YES YES YES
No. of Communities
(Community × Year Effects) 0 0 0 10 20
No. of Observations 7607 7607 7607 7607 7607
Notes: The table reports IV-2SLS estimates of model (12). All estimates are restricted to firms
with at least one nonzero connection (g(ij)t 6= 0) in any year t; all observations of these firms
are also included for years with no connections. Models in columns 1 and 2 employ the distance
2 instrument; models in columns 2 through 5 employ the distance 3 instrument. All estimates
include firm and year fixed effects. Columns 4 and 5 include additional community-by-year fixed
effects, where communities are obtained via the Louvain algorithm with ϕ = 0.8 (10 communities)
in column 4 and ϕ = 0.6 (20 communities) in column 5. Standard errors are clustered by the
20 “communities” obtained via the Louvain algorithm with ϕ = 0.6 (small sample corrections are
applied). All observations of the same individual firm in different years enter the same cluster.
Asterisks denote conventional significance levels of t-tests (∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01).
overcome the problem, I assume that the residual shock υit presents an AR(1) time
dependence structure with “innovation” εit:
υit = ρυi(t−1) + εit, ρ ∈ (0, 1) (18)
and I estimate the model by performing System GMM on the ρ-differenced version
of (12), following Blundell and Bond (1998, 2000).30 Specifically, I treat conventional
30As noted by Wooldridge (2009) and discussed in more detail by Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer
(2015) the ρ-differenced “dynamic panel” approach for the estimation of production functions bears
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inputs, internal R&D and external R&D as endogenous; I employ third and higher
lags of both their levels and first differences as instruments (in the differences and level
equations, respectively). Conversely, the other right-hand side spillover and demand
side controls are either lagged quantities or factors outside the control of firms, thus I
treat them as predetermined and independent of εit. Following a customary approach,
I recover the structural parameters of interest from the steady-state representation of
the ρ-differenced equation; these estimates are displayed in Table 5. In Appendix E
I illustrate the estimation procedure in more detail; in addition I report and discuss
the System GMM estimates of the ρ-differenced model.
Column (1) of Table 5 displays the baseline results from System GMM estimation
of the model, obtained by instrumenting the spillover variable with appropriate “GMM
style” lags. The elasticities of “private” inputs are estimated differently with respect
to their OLS or 2SLS counterparts: as expected, the labor elasticity shrinks while the
capital and private R&D elasticities are larger. By contrast, the estimate of δ (around
0.010) is not statistically significant from zero. Note that under the standard System
GMM assumptions, δ is identified. Yet, the network’s characteristics may exacerbate
problems of weak instruments type that are typical of this procedure: since one firm’s
connections may be very different after three years, standard GMM instruments may
have low predictive power. To address this I substitute the spillover instruments in













which extend (15). These instruments have the effect of improving the statistical effi-
ciency of the estimates. Column (2) reports the results from the inclusion of moments
(19) with D = 2: δˆ increases to 0.014, but it is still not statistically significant. Mov-
ing to D = 3 (column 3) results in δˆ ' 0.017, now statistically significant at the 10%
level. With the inclusion of community-by-year effects (columns 4-5) δ is estimated
at around 0.021 – about the same value as the corresponding 2SLS estimates – and
is significant at the 5% level. Observe that the estimates of the capital, labor and
private R&D elasticities from columns 4 and 5 take realistic and conventional values.
important analogies with semi-parametric control function methods á la Olley and Pakes (1996) and
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). The two approaches make different assumptions about the unobserved
shock ωit, but nevertheless result in analogous moment conditions.
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Table 5: Production Function, System GMM Estimates, 1981-2001
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Private R&D (γ) 0.1234∗∗ 0.0786∗∗ 0.0959∗∗ 0.0880∗∗∗ 0.0668∗
(0.0470) (0.0359) (0.0367) (0.0306) (0.0366)
R&D Spillovers (δ) 0.0098 0.0142 0.0167∗ 0.0212∗∗ 0.0207∗∗
(0.0099) (0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0088) (0.0087)
Geographic Spillovers 0.0160 0.0189∗ 0.0067 0.0036 0.0063
(0.0136) (0.0104) (0.0123) (0.0124) (0.0113)
Capital 0.2731∗∗∗ 0.2580∗∗ 0.2603∗∗ 0.2743∗∗∗ 0.2947∗∗
(0.0806) (0.0961) (0.0912) (0.0936) (0.1054)
Labor 0.5555∗∗∗ 0.6096∗∗∗ 0.6136∗∗∗ 0.5992∗∗∗ 0.6049∗∗∗
(0.0836) (0.0990) (0.0934) (0.1036) (0.1172)
Jaffe Tech. Proximity -0.0555∗ -0.0391 -0.0590∗∗ -0.0783∗∗∗ -0.0682∗∗
(0.0313) (0.0277) (0.0249) (0.0247) (0.0281)
Lags s of GMM-style IVs s ≥ 3 s ≥ 3 s ≥ 3 s ≥ 3 s ≥ 3
Diff. Eq. Spillover IVs Standard Standard Standard Standard Standard
Level Eq. Spillover IVs Standard D = 2 D = 3 D = 3 D = 3
Time Effects YES YES YES YES YES
Only Network YES YES YES YES YES
No. of Communities
(Community × Year Effects) 0 0 0 10 20
No. of Instruments 978 962 962 1142 1342
No. of Observations 7185 7185 7185 7185 7185
Notes: The table reports System GMM estimates of model (12). All estimates are restricted to
firms with at least one nonzero connection (g(ij)t 6= 0) in any year t; all observations of these
firms are also included for years with no connections. The ρ-differenced production function is
estimated by one step System GMM: lags s of the endogenous variables in levels are employed as
instruments in the differenced equation; lags s of the same variables in first differences are used as
instruments in the level equation. In columns (2) through (5) the standard GMM instruments of
the spillover variables for the level equation are substituted by moments (19) for the given value
of D. All estimates include year fixed effects. Columns 4 and 5 include additional community-
by-year fixed effects, where communities are obtained via the Louvain algorithm with ϕ = 0.8
(10 communities) in column 4 and ϕ = 0.6 (20 communities) in column 5. Structural parameters
are recovered from the steady-state representation of the ρ-differenced model; standard errors are
calculated by the Delta Method (see Appendix E for details). Standard errors are clustered by
the 20 “communities” obtained via the Louvain algorithm with ϕ = 0.6 (small sample corrections
are applied). All observations of the same individual firm in different years enter the same cluster.
Asterisks denote conventional significance levels of t-tests (∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01).
To summarize, both 2SLS and System GMM estimates of the production function
obtained with distance 3 instruments point to a value of δ in a neighborhood of 0.021.
For a connected pair of firms with a link of average strength, this implies a 0.0013%
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increase in firm sales following a 1% increase in external R&D. For a connected firm
with an average row sum of connections, the implied elasticity is about 0.0105 given
a 1% increase in the R&D stock of all its linkages. This estimate of δ is about twice
as large as the corresponding value obtained by performing simple OLS on the same
subsample. The difference is only apparent when employing the distance 3 instrument
in isolation, suggesting that the distance 2 instrument might be itself correlated with
the unobserved characteristics of firms. In light of Proposition 2, this fact is consistent
with the hypothesis that the spatial correlation of R&D is driven by exogenous factors
rather than by the endogenous reflection of shocks: (C,L) = (2, 0).
Several non-mutually exclusive hypotheses can be put forward to rationalize the
finding that OLS estimates of δ are negatively biased. Perhaps, the simplest explana-
tion is that there is measurement error in (external) R&D or in network connections.
Instrumental variables may address this problem; however, the distance 2 instrument
does not seem to do so in this context, as one would expect under “classical” measure-
ment error. More structural explanations would point to correlated effects or network
endogeneity. Common shocks can induce a negative bias of OLS if they extend to
factors that negatively affect the variation of R&D. If, for example, own unobserved
productivity υit strongly correlates with external R&D costs $jt, and firms’ R&D is
very responsive to costs, it could follow that E [logSjt · υit] < 0 (see Appendix B for
additional discussion). The negative bias can also be explained in terms of network
endogeneity, if firms with relatively stronger connections are also relatively less pro-
ductive. For example, smaller firms may substitute in-house R&D with learning from
the R&D of larger firms, by attracting many inventors that are connected to them.
4.3 Market Value
The estimates of the market value model (16) are displayed in Table 6. In columns
(1) and (2) I report OLS estimates, respectively conducted on the whole sample and
on the network subsample. In columns (3), (4) and (5) I show instead the results of
2SLS estimates performed on the subsample, employing the distance 2 instrument,
both instruments and just the distance 3 instrument, respectively. As in the case of the
production function, restricting the sample to the network implies a reduction in the
main spillover parameter δ˜ (from 0.034 to 0.026). The IV strategy, however, results
in a rebound of such estimate up to about 0.038. Unlike the production function
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case, however, this increase is uniform across all IV estimates. In fact, employing the
distance 3 instrument in isolation results in a less precise, albeit similar, estimate of δ˜
(with a 7.7% p-value). For a connected firm with average row-sum g¯it = 0.5, δ˜ ' 0.038
implies about a 0.017 elasticity of all its connections’ R&D on its own Tobin’s q.
Table 6: Market Value (Tobin’s q), OLS and 2SLS Estimates, 1981-2001
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Industry-level Sales 0.1743∗∗∗ 0.1966∗∗ 0.1944∗∗ 0.1943∗∗ 0.1946∗∗
(0.0515) (0.0714) (0.0700) (0.0700) (0.0703)
R&D Spillovers (δ˜) 0.0338∗∗∗ 0.0264∗∗∗ 0.0386∗∗∗ 0.0387∗∗∗ 0.0374∗
(0.0074) (0.0080) (0.0100) (0.0098) (0.0200)
Geographic Spillovers -0.0099 -0.0079 -0.0083 -0.0083 -0.0083
(0.0065) (0.0060) (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0058)
Jaffe Tech. Proximity 0.1088 -0.1164 -0.1696 -0.1698 -0.1643
(0.1126) (0.1640) (0.1553) (0.1555) (0.1611)
BSV Business Stealing -0.0344 0.1058 0.1020 0.1020 0.1024
(0.0505) (0.0963) (0.0967) (0.0967) (0.0976)
S/K polynomial: F -statistic 24.19 25.21 26.31 26.35 24.09
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Spillovers IV(s) OLS OLS D = 2 D = 2, 3 D = 3
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES
Only Network NO YES YES YES YES
No. of Observations 12309 7481 7481 7481 7481
Notes: The table reports various estimates of model (16). All estimates from column 2 through 5
are restricted to firms with a nonzero connection (g(ij)t 6= 0) in any year t; all observations of these
firms are also included for years with no connections. Columns 1 and 2 report OLS estimates;
columns 3, 4 and 5 report 2SLS estimates that employ different combinations of exogenous in-
struments, specifically: only the distance 2 instrument (3), both the distance 2 and 3 instruments
(4), and only the distance 3 instrument (5). All estimates include firm and year fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered by the 20 “communities” obtained via the Louvain algorithm with
ϕ = 0.6 (small sample corrections are applied). All observations of the same individual firm in
different years enter the same cluster. For estimates not restricted to the network, firms outside
the network constitute single clusters. Asterisks denote conventional significance levels of t-tests
(∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01).
4.4 Patent Count
The results for the patent count model (17) are shown in Table 7, which is organized
along the same lines of Table 6. Specifically, column (1) reports baseline estimates on
the entire sample; column (2) those restricted to the network subsample, while the
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results from the control function approach, following the usual sequence of instrument
combinations, are given in columns (3), (4) and (5). The main spillover parameter
δ˘ is estimated at between 0.03 and 0.04 in columns (1) through (4). The estimates
from column (5) however, obtained via a control function approach only based on
the distance 3 instrument, register a much larger point estimate of δ˘ ' 0.114. For a
connected firm with an average row-sum of connections, this corresponds to a 0.057
elasticity of patent output following a 1% increase of all connections’ R&D. By con-
trast, the elasticity of private R&D is typically estimated at between 0.070 and 0.075.
Observe how, in these estimates, the geography-based measure of spillovers is both
statistically and economically significant, while the Jaffe measure loses again all its
economic and statistical significance once the analysis is restricted to the network.
Table 7: Cit. Weighted Patent Count, Maximum Likelihood Estimates, 1981-2001
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cit. Weighted Patents (t− 1) 0.3850∗∗∗ 0.4127∗∗∗ 0.4082∗∗∗ 0.4100∗∗∗ 0.3936∗∗∗
(0.0177) (0.0187) (0.0182) (0.0182) (0.0190)
Private R&D (γ˘) 0.0657∗ 0.0755∗∗ 0.0745∗∗ 0.0756∗∗ 0.0699∗∗
(0.0337) (0.0330) (0.0332) (0.0333) (0.0326)
R&D Spillovers (δ˘) 0.0321∗∗∗ 0.0305∗∗∗ 0.0394∗∗∗ 0.0362∗∗∗ 0.1141∗∗∗
(0.0068) (0.0058) (0.0085) (0.0084) (0.0190)
Geographic Spillovers 0.0390∗∗∗ 0.0443∗∗∗ 0.0433∗∗∗ 0.0441∗∗∗ 0.0244∗
(0.0110) (0.0126) (0.0124) (0.0125) (0.0126)
Jaffe Tech. Proximity 0.3269∗∗∗ 0.0662 0.0638 0.0643 0.0517
(0.0467) (0.0779) (0.0774) (0.0776) (0.0768)
Industry Dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Only Network NO YES YES YES YES
Control Function IV(s) None None D = 2 D = 2, 3 D = 3
No. of Observations 11866 6941 6941 6941 6941
Notes: The table reports maximum likelihood estimates of model (17). All estimates from column
2 through 5 are restricted to firms with at least one nonzero connection (g(ij)t 6= 0) in any year
t; all observations of these firms are also included for years with no connections. A sixth-degree
polynomial of the predicted residuals from “control function” regressions is included in estimates
reported in columns 3, 4 and 5. Specifically,
∑
j 6=i g(ij)t logSjt is regressed on the Zitq controls,
4-digits industry effects, year fixed effects, and: the distance 2 instrument (column 3), both the
distance 2 and 3 instruments (column 4), only the distance 3 instrument (column 5). All estimates
include 4-digits industry dummies and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by the
20 “communities” obtained via the Louvain algorithm with ϕ = 0.6 (small sample corrections are
applied). All observations of the same individual firm in multiple years enter the same cluster.
For estimates not restricted to the network, firms outside the network constitute single clusters.
Asterisks denote conventional significance levels of t-tests (∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01).
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4.5 Social Returns of R&D
To quantify the economic relevance of the estimated spillovers, it is useful to evaluate
the Marginal Social Return (MSR) of R&D in its relationship with the corresponding
Marginal Private Return (MPR). For any firm i, the MPR of R&D is defined as the
marginal increase of output following a marginal increase of its private R&D stock.
The MSR, on the other hand, extends this definition by considering how output varies
at the margin along with the R&D of all other firms. Under the simplifying hypothesis
of a homogeneous percentage increase of all firms’ R&D stock (dSi/Si = dSj/Sj for
all i and j), the MSR and MPR relative to firm i are easily obtained from (2):






this illustrates how, in general, the MSR exceeds the MPR by an amount that depends
on the strength of connections. To calculate aggregate values for the MPR and MSR, I
take the average of both expressions in (20) by pooling firms with nonzero connections
(g¯it > 0) over all years, and using estimates γˆ ' 6.68% and δˆ ' 2.07% from column (5)
of Table 5. This exercise results in a network-wide MPR evaluated at around 102%,
and in a corresponding aggregate MSR approximately equal to 114%: about 112% of
the MPR.31 These are realistic and economically significant values, comparable with
evaluations from other studies (see Hall et al., 2010).32
5 Conclusion
In this paper I propose a new method for evaluating R&D spillovers. By aggregating
information on patent collaboration relationships between individuals that work for
different organizations, I construct a network of firms that are reciprocally connected
through their respective R&D teams. I evaluate the dependence of firm productivity,
market value and patent production rate from the R&D performed by firms connected
31Note that these are the calculated returns from the R&D stock. To estimate the returns from
annual R&D expenditures, one should divide these figures by the steady-state flow/stock ratio. Under
the typical assumption of a 0.20 steady-state ratio, one obtains approximately a 20% private return
and a 23% social return from yearly R&D expenditures. Within the network subsample pooled over
years, the average flow/stock ratio is 0.183 with 0.118 standard deviation.
32Note that excluding firms without connections from the calculation results in a higher MSR by
construction, because those firms do not receive spillovers. However, connected firms are larger and
more R&D intensive, and they represent a disproportionately larger share of the U.S. economy.
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in the network, weighted by the intensity of mutual links. Concerned by the possibile
presence of common confounders that simultaneously drive R&D choices, the intensity
of cross-firm connections as well as firm-level outcomes, I employ a novel identification
strategy based on the network topology. In particular, I instrument the R&D choices
of one firm’s direct connections with those of sufficiently distant indirect links. Under
conditions specified by a formal model of firms’ interaction, appropriately constructed
instrumental variables predict the intensity of spillovers received by one firm, but are
otherwise unrelated to its performance and innovation outcomes.
Estimates based on this definition of connections register sizable spillovers of con-
nected firms’ R&D on the productivity, market value, and patent output measures.
These results, unlike those based on more traditional metrics of R&D spillovers, are
robust to different specifications, and to the restriction of the sample to the largest
and most R&D intensive firms. In conformity with the prediction of the theoretical
model, the application of the identification strategy that I propose shows that, when
instrumenting peers’ R&D with the R&D of sufficiently distant indirect links, point
estimates of spillover effects on both productivity and patent output increase substan-
tially. This suggests that unobserved factors driving, on the one hand R&D and/or
network connections, and firm outcomes on the other hand, might do so in opposite
directions. I use the estimates of spillovers obtained from the proposed methodology
to evaluate the relative importance of the marginal social returns to R&D relative to
the private returns, finding that the former are about 112% of the latter among firms
that are connected to the network.
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Appendix A Analytical Model: Proofs






















where the term in square brackets represents the uncertainty about the R&D invest-
ment choices of other firms. Firms respond in equilibrium to network externalities;
as these depend on correlated shocks all firms make use of their available information
in order to accurately predict them. Consider that the Q+ 1 First Order Conditions
relative to Si and (Xi1, . . . , XiQ) are sufficient to characterize a maximum, since the






































 eωi − ξq′ = 0 (A.2)
with (A.2) taken for q′ = 1, . . . , Q. Combining (A.1) with each of the Q conditions





for q = 1, . . . , Q. These relationships state that the vector of equilibrium input choices
is uniquely determined for every firm given their optimal R&D decisions and $i, thus
motivating (5). Intuitively, R&D is a sufficient statistic of equilibrium externalities
(actually each of the Q+1 choice variables can be considered as such, but singling out
Si is more convenient). Therefore, in order to demonstrate existence and uniqueness
of the Bayes-Nash equilibrium under the conditions stated in the text, it is sufficient
to show the existence of a fixed point of the R&D equilibrium choices Si.


















where µ ≡ log γ +∑Qq=1 βq (log βq − log ξq − log γ). Note that expression (A.4) is a
mapping from the space Ω of all information sets that can be available to players and
the set of other players’ strategies S−i onto the set of positive real numbers, which I
denote as S∗i : Ω × RN−1++ → R++. By definition, a fixed point of the vector-valued
A.1
function S∗ = (S∗1 , . . . , S∗N) is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the game. Clearly, there is
a one-to-one relationship between S∗ = (S∗1 , . . . , S∗N) and the associated logarithmic
function log S∗ = (logS∗1 , . . . , logS∗N). It turns out that it is more convenient to show
existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium in its logarithmic form.
Denote the space spanned by log S∗ = (logS∗1 , . . . , logS∗N) as S, and endow it of
the max-norm ‖log S∗‖ = maxi‖logS∗i ‖∞. Define the operator H : S → S as:
Hi (logS
∗























for i = 1, . . . , N ; this is well-defined as there is a one-to-one relationship between S∗i
and its logarithm. The operator is based on the “manipulated” First Order Conditions
of the restricted game (A.4), hence it is consistent with expected utility maximization.
Consider that, for any two (log S∗, log Z∗) ∈ S2, it is:
‖H (log S∗ ), H( log Z∗)‖ = max
i












































∥∥∥ ‖logS∗i − logZ∗i ‖
where g¯i =
∑N
j=1 gij; the fourth line (second inequality) follows from the observation
that, because δg¯i < 1 for all i = 1, . . . , N , by Jensen’s inequality:






a difference which is monotonically increasing in Si > 0 for all Ωi ∈ Ω. Consequently,












which is smaller than 1 under the conditions stated in the text. In such a circumstance,
by the Contraction Mapping Theorem both log S∗ and S∗ have a fixed point, implying
that the game has a unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
A.2
It still needs to be demonstrated that equilibrium R&D S∗i is expressible as (4).
To this end, rewrite that equation as logS∗i = µϑδ−1bi + s∗i (Ωi,G) for some generic




























+ s∗i (Ωi,G) (A.5)
it easy to see that this expression conforms to the definition of the contraction operator
H, and that s∗i (Ωi,G) has the form given in the text. For (A.5) to be consistent also




gijbj = bi = b
∗
i (G;ϑ)
for every firm i = 1, . . . , N . Rewrite the first equality above in matrix form:
ι+ ϑGb = b
where G is the adjacency matrix with gij entries and b = (b1, . . . , bN)
T. Since matrix
(I− ϑG) is invertible almost surely, a solution for b exists almost always and reads
as:






the series converges under the conditions stated in the text. The solution is exactly
the vector of Katz-Bonacich centrality measures with attenuation parameter ϑ.
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof is constructive, and it is intuitive given basic
concepts of graph theory. For any pair of firms i and j such that dij = D > C+L, take
any of their shortest paths of length D. Then, order the intermediate connections
along the chosen path: ` = 0, . . . , D where (without loss of generality) i = 0 and
j = D. By Assumption 2 and the definition of path in a network, {ω`, $`} /∈ Ωj if
` < L. Thus, the shortest path connecting {ωi, $i} with any element of set Ωj has
length D−L. Since D−L > C, {ωi, $i} and all the elements of Ωj are orthogonal by
A.3






= 0 because of equation (4). If this is true
for the shortest path connecting i and j, it must be so for any other path, thereby
establishing (6). By analogous reasoning, suppose that dij = D > C + 2L, and take
the shortest path between i and j as defined earlier. In addition to the considerations
above, {ω`, $`} /∈ Ωi if ` > L, hence the shortest path connecting any element of set
Ωi with any element of set Ωj has lengthD−2L > C. Consequently, the optimal R&D
choices of firms i and j are in equilibrium functions of mutually independent sets of
random variables, which implies (7). Finally, the same result cannot be established
for firms that are distant C + 2L or less, which is reflected in (8).
Proof of Proposition 3. Recall from the First Order Conditions that in equilibrium,
logX∗iq = logS
∗




i (G) + s∗i (Ωi;G)−$i
for some firm-specific function of the network topology x∗i (G). The stochastic prop-
erties of equilibrium inputs are driven by the term s∗i (Ωi;G) − $i; but since $i is
always listed in Ωi by Assumption 2, logX∗iq must be orthogonal to any combination
of random variables that is also orthogonal to logS∗i . Hence, an analysis similar to
the one made above would demonstrate that logX∗iq and logS∗j are independent for
all Q conventional inputs as long as dij = D > C + 2L, which proves (9).
A.4
Appendix B Additional Discussion of the Model
In this appendix I extend the analytical framework of the paper and analyze in more
depth some of its properties. This appendix is divided in three independent parts. In
the first part I explore models of network formation between multi-technology firms,
showing that their predictions are largely consistent with Assumption 1. In the second
part I illustrate how the model may deliver equilibria that are empirically associated
to a negative bias of OLS estimates of δ. In the third part I sketch a dynamic version
of the model in which firms accumulare knowledge capital over time, examining under
what circumstances the main result of Proposition 2 is still valid.
B.1 Network Formation
In what follows I illustrate models of network formation between firms operating in
different technological areas. These models are at least in part stochastic – reflecting
the fact that connections between firms may be driven by factors outside the control
of firm managers, such as freely moving inventors. In some of these models I allow for
connections to be caused by both random factors and firms’ decisions reflecting cost-
benefit evaluations. As my objective is to illustrate how network formation relates to
the cross-correlation of firms’ productivity shocks conditional on network distance, it
is appropriate to introduce more primitive concepts that drive both firms’ similarities
and their association in the network. To this end, I provide a micro-foundation of the
firm-specific productivity shock ωi in terms of “fundamental technologies.”
Let U be a set of U “fundamental technologies” that firms are capable to recombine
for production purposes. Index such technologies as u = 1, . . . , U . Each of theN firms
is exogenously endowed of knowledge about some of the elements in U . Specifically,
let liu = 1 denote that firm i knows about fundamental technology u, otherwise liu = 0
(with
∑U






where (ν1, . . . , νU) is a set of “fundamental technology shocks,” each of them drawn
from some unspecified distribution but all of them independent from one another, that
represent how much a specific fundamental technology translates into productivity
advantages. This amounts to characterize ωi as a “spatial moving average” process in
the space of fundamental technologies. Therefore, the cross-correlation of ωi between
any two firms depends on the overlap over their knowledge of different fundamental
technologies. Note that I could as well have specified (B.1) as a non-linear function
of the shocks νu, possibly allowing for interaction terms. The linearity assumption is
made for convenience and is of little consequence. The crucial assumption is that the
“fundamental” technologies are independent of one another (hence their name).
B.1
I am now ready to illustrate alternative models of network formation, which are
discussed in sequence. In all models, connections in the network depend on the extent
to which two firms overlap in the space of fundamental technologies. For simplicity I
abstract from cost shocks $i. However, the discussion about the cross-correlation of
ωi in the network may be easily extended to that of $i, so long as the latter is made
dependent on fundamental technologies as well.
Pure Technological Association. In the simplest model of network formation that






u=1 (liu + lju) ν
2
u
≡ ĝij ∈ [0, 1] (B.2)
that is, cross-firm connections are equal to the ratio between the sum of the squared
“fundamental” shocks νu that are common to both firms, and the sum of all squared
shocks pertaining to at least one of the two firms. I call this ratio “similarity factor”
and I denote it as ĝij. Note the analogy between ĝij and the measure of connection
(10) introduced in this article. Rule (B.2) has the following interpretation: bilateral
connections between firms solely depend on the similarity of their technologies, and
so of their inventors’ specializations. It does not allow for other determinants.
The model can be enriched, for example, by making gij a function of ĝij (say, its
square root), or by introducing some random component (to the extent that gij 6= 0
if ĝij 6= 0). However, any of these variations would not affect the main property of
this model: by rule (B.2), Assumption 1 would be satisfied for C = 1, as firms with
similar technologies (that is, Cov (ωi, ωj) 6= 0) would always be connected, while firms
with unrelated technologies (Cov (ωi, ωj) = 0) would never be.
Random Technological Association. Consider instead the case of an unweighted
network where gij ∈ {0, 1}, and the following rule that determines whether any two
firms are connected:
gij = 1 [ĝij − ηij ≥ 0] (B.3)
where ηij ∈ [0, 1] is some random shock specific to the (i, j) pair. This rule can be
interpreted as follows: two firms are connected if their similarity ĝij is larger than some
“cost” ηij associated with the connection. Such a cost, in turn, may be interpreted in
multiple ways. For example, it is the cost of letting information “leak” if gij represents
spontaneous inventor interactions; in the case of formal R&D joint ventures instead,
it may represent the cost of managing the relationship between the two firms. This
model is similar to the one by Graham (2017), but with some differences. Graham’s
model explicitly distinguishes between firm-specific shocks, pair-specific shocks and
firm characteristics; here the similarity factor ĝij accounts for all possible “advantages”
from the connection, while other firms characteristics, such as input factors, are not
to be included as they are themselves endogenous to the model’s primitives.
B.2
This model may be crudely extended to the case of a weighted network as follows:
gij = 1 [ĝij − ηij ≥ 0] · ĝij (B.4)
that is, connections are equal to the similarity factor so long as the “cost” ηij is low
enough (one can think to make the intensity of the connection gij a function of ηij,
or to include an additional random factor that affects, but this is beyond the point of
this analysis). Note that, in general, Assumption 1 will not be exactly met in such a
model: however unlikely, it is very well possible that two firms with nonzero similarity
end up very far apart from one another. The “however unlikely” part of this sentence,
however, should be adequately stressed. In fact, the probability that two firms i and
j with nonzero similarity, and so with Cov (ωi, ωj) 6= 0, end up distant more than 2
degrees away from one another, is typically very small.
To see this, suppose that the shocks ηij are all independently drawn from some
distribution B (η): the probability that any firm k links up to another firm ` is given
by B (ĝk`). Thus, the probability that firms i and j end up at distance higher than 2
is:
Pr (dij > 2| ĝij 6= 0) = [1−B (ĝij)]
∏
k∈Kij
[1−B (ĝik)B (ĝjk)] (B.5)
where Kij ⊂ I is the set of all firms with nonzero similarity with both firms i and j
(Kij = {k ∈ I : ĝik 6= 0 ∧ ĝjk 6= 0}). It is easy to establish regularity conditions under
which as the set of firms expands (N grows larger), and Kij does too for all pairs (for
this to be true it is enough that “new” firms are associated with a random subset of
U) the probability in (B.5) goes to zero for every appropriate pair (i, j). By analogous
reasoning, it can be argued that the probability of any two similar firms ending up
more than three degrees of separation apart is even smaller. Thus, Assumption 1 can
be thought to “asymptotically” hold for C = 2 (or, to play it safe, for C = 3).






gikgjk − ηij ≥ 0
]
· ĝij (B.6)
where parameter κ corresponds to the presence of “preference for triadic closure” or
“structural transitivity” in models of network formation: the hypothesis that any two
agents are more likely to form mutual connections if they are both connected to some
third party. In this article’s context, κ > 0 can be interpreted as the possibility that
inventors from two different firms are more likely to interact if both groups do so with
inventors of other firms; this can be motivated on lower costs of information leakage or
some underlying social dynamics. Models of network formation that include structural
transitivity are known to feature multiple equilibria; the econometric identification of
the preference for triadic closure is an area of active research (Graham, 2015).
B.3
The presence of structural transitivity in network formation would clearly rein-
force any mechanism of assortativity on unobserved characteristics, such as “funda-
mental technologies.” To see how this relates to the identification strategy proposed
in this paper, consider the previous discussion about how Assumption 1 would hold
asymptotically under random technological association. If connections are formed in
equilibrium according to rule (B.6) with κ > 0, then as both I and Kij expand not
only the conditional probability that dij = 2 for any two firms i and j would approach
one, but also the unconditional probability that dij = 1 (gij 6= 0) increases. By analo-
gous reasoning, in presence of structural transitivity the probability that at least two
“similar” connections of firms i and j are connected increases faster as the network
grows larger, implying larger terms of the type B (ĝik)B (ĝjk) and thus even faster
convergence of the probability in (B.5) to zero. Thus, structural transitivity does not
challenge the identification strategy proposed in this article; in fact, if the tendency
to triadic closure is a feature of network formation independent of firm unobservables,
the credibility of the empirical strategy would be strengthened.
Forward-looking Network Formation. It is difficult to modify the game presented
in Section 1 to allow for “strategic” (instead of random) network formation in the first
stage. The reason is that while input choices are taken by individual firms, connections
are bilateral: the initial stage has to be modeled as a set of 1
2
N (N − 1) decisions about
pair-specific connections, with possible interdependencies and multiple equilibria. It
is nevertheless possible to show that such an exercise would not affect the conceptual
framework in a sensible way. To appreciate this, suppose that after nature has drawn
the technology shocks and firms’ unobservables, any two firms i and j cooperatively
form a weighted link gij, by applying backward induction, as follows:










]− r (gij, ĝij)} (B.7)
where pii (·) is the profit function of firm i (and symmetrically for j), (S∗,X∗) is the
vector of Bayes-Nash equilibrium input choices expressed in Proposition 1, G∗−ij is the
equilibrium set of connection decisions taken by all other firm pairs, and r (gij, ĝij)
is a “link cost function” that is increasing in the intensity of the connection gij (the
stronger the link, the higher the cost to maintain it), and decreasing in the similarity
factor ĝij (the more similar are two firms’ technologies, the easier for them to link up).
This cost function is assumed dependent on firms’ similarity factor for simplicity, so
to avoid modifying the benefit part of the trade-off (joint firm profits do not depend
on how “similar” ωi and ωj are, as per the setup of the model in Section 1).
Denote the “combined profits in absence of a connection” as follows:
Π∗ij ≡ pii
[




(S∗,X∗) , gij = 0,G∗−ij
]
(note that Π∗ij is a function of ωi and ωj, so it is a random variable). Clearly, firms i
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and j are jointly better off by being connected (gij > 0) so long as:
Π∗ij − r (gij = 0, ĝij) ≥ 0






) ≥ 0 (B.8)






is a decreasing function of Π∗ij, but it does not
depend on how similar ωi and ωj are (if the two shocks are correlated but take small
values, combined profits decrease; vice versa two unrelated firms may both receive
high draws of ωi). Note the equivalence between (B.8) and (B.3), and by extension
the analogy with (B.4): cross-firm connections appear in those firm pairs for which
the similarity factor ĝij is larger than the realization of some random variable which
is independent of ĝij itself. Therefore, the previous discussion on how Assumption 1
holds asymptotically can also be extended to a setup of forward-looking cooperative
network formation. Because optimal input choices in the ensuing subgame would still
be expressed as the result of Proposition 1, Propositions 2 and 3 would still be valid
(albeit asymptotically) implying little threat for the proposed empirical strategy.
B.2 Negative Bias Prediction
A possible explanation of the negative bias associated with OLS of δ is that this is
in fact a structural feature of the data generation process. For this to be consistent
with the proposed conceptual framework, it is necessary that the model can give rise
to equilibria in which, for two connected firms i and j (gij 6= 0), the following three












∣∣ dij = 1) < 0
Cov (ωj, logS∗i | dij = 1) < 0
(B.9)
This apparently counterintuitive circumstance cannot be rationalized by standard
supply-side models of production featuring spillovers and strategic complementarities,
short of introducing some spatial dependence across firm costs. That is, it may arise if
the spatial cross-correlation of the cost factor$ drives that of R&D disproportionately
more than how the cross-correlation of productivity shocks ω does. In fact, since R&D
costs affect R&D investment negatively, it might be that the covariance between one
firm’s (i) productivity residual and the R&D of some its connections (j) is dominated
by a negative term which is driven directly by the moment Cov (ωj, $j), and indirectly
by Cov (ωi, ωj). Intuitively, if there are common shocks in ωi and $i, if cost factors
co-evolve together with firms’ technologies, and finally if R&D expenditures are quite
(negatively) dependent on R&D costs $i, then ωi and logSj are negatively correlated.
B.5
A Parametric Example. The set of inequalities in (B.9) are expressed with respect
to a specific pair of firms i and j; for this prediction to be the source of the negative
OLS bias of δ, it must be more general. In what follows, I outline a specific structure
of the model such that the relationships in (B.9) hold simultaneously for all poten-
tially connected pairs in the network. Specifically, consider the case where the joint
distribution of (ωi, ωj, $i, $j) is such that:
Corr (ωi, ωj) = Corr ($i, $j) = gij ∈ [0, 1)
for all pairs of firms (i, j), i 6= j, i, j = 1, . . . , N . Furthermore, suppose that firms only
observe their private shocks: Ωi = {ωi, $i} for i = 1, . . . , N ; and that F (ω,$| G)
is a multivariate normal distribution. In this specific case it particularly easy to see
(but the result is more general) that equilibrium R&D is a linear function of private
shocks: s∗i (Ωi,G) = a0i + a1i (ωi − κ$i) for a0i , a1i > 0 and κ ≡ 1 −
∑Q
q=1 βq ∈ (0, 1).
Denote ς` ≡ Var (ω`) and %` ≡ Cov (ω`, $`) for ` = i, j, and assume further that
Var ($i) = %2i ςi
Var ($j) = %2j ςj
Corr (ωi, $j) = gij
Corr (ωj, $i) = gij









ςi · · · · · · · · ·
gij
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2 with ` = i, j
(note that these are realistic values of gij given the descriptives in Figure 2), which
makes it a legitimate characterization of the random vector (ωi, ωj, $i, $j). Under
all these hypotheses, the inequalities in (B.9) can be expressed after some calculation
as the following expressions:
Cov
(
a1i (ωj − κ$j) , a1j (ωj − κ$j)





j (ωj − κ$j)





i (ωi − κ$i)
) ∝ 1− κ%i < 0
which all hold simultaneously as long as %i, %j > κ−1. While this example is stylized it
illustrates quite well that, for (B.9) to hold, both Cov (ωi, $i) and Cov (ωj, $j) must
be large enough, so that cost shocks predominate the variation of external R&D.
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B.3 Dynamic Model (Sketched)
Here I sketch a two-period version of the model in which firms accumulate R&D stocks
by making yearly investments in R&D (flows). The purpose is to illustrate under what
circumstances the main result of Proposition 2 also applies in the more general case of
a dynamic model. For simplicity, in what follows I omit conventional inputs. I discuss
two possible scenarios corresponding to different economic assumptions. In the first of
the two scenarios, firms commit in advance to a future sequence of R&D investment
(flows). In the second scenario, firms are able to revise their R&D investment choices
in every period. I analyze the two scenarios in sequence.
Pre-commitment
Firms might have compelling reasons to commit to a long-term plan of R&D invest-
ment. One reason might be financial: say, for example, that venture capital support
is conditional on long-term projects. More structural reasons are probably related to
the actual nature of R&D activity: highly risky, characterized by large fixed costs and
requiring many years to yield (potentially high) rewards. Thus, it might be optimal
for firms to commit in advance to long-term R&D plans.
Under commitment, the firm’s objective function reads as:




















− e$i1Ri1 − ψE [e$i2|Ωi1]Ri2
where the first term represents revenue in t = 1, the second term is revenue in t = 2,
and the last two terms denote costs over the two periods. Here Rit ∈ R++ is the R&D
investment (flow) in period t, ζ ∈ [0, 1] is the depreciation parameter, while ψ ∈ [0, 1]
is the discount factor. The R&D stock for t = 1 is identical to the flow: Ri1 = Ri1.
For t = 2 instead, it is given by the current investment plus the past depreciated flow:
Si2 = ζRi1 +Ri2. Note how connections weights are allowed to vary over time.
Suppose that the game rules are the same as in the one-period case: first nature
draws types, then firms observe their own information set, so to make simultaneous
choices of Ri1 and Ri2 for both periods. Now the Bayes-Nash equilibrium is technically
expressed as fixed point of (R1,R2) = (R11, . . . , RN1, R21, . . . , RN2). However, there
is clearly a one-to-one mapping between a fixed point of R&D flows and a fixed point
of both periods’ R&D stocks, which are a linear function of flows.
The First Order Conditions are sufficient for a maximum; with some manipulation
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they can be expressed in terms of R&D stocks as follows:









 eωi1 + ψζE [e$i2|Ωi1]− e$i1 = 0











− ψE [e$i2|Ωi1] = 0
consequently, the R&D stocks of both periods Si1 and Si2 is an implicit function of
the information set at time 1, Ωi1. Hence, the results from Proposition 2 (and thus of
Proposition 3, in the extension of the model that includes conventional inputs) apply
in this case as well, with reference to the values of C1 and L1 valid at t = 1. I omit
the proof that the equilibrium is unique under proper conditions as this is a tedious
extension of the proof from the one-period case.
Observe how the dynamics of the networks do not matter towards the determi-
nation of the equilibrium’s stochastic properties: only the information set Ωi1 and
the cross-correlation of the shocks at the time when the decisions are taken affect the
cross-correlation of R&D stocks. This implies that if any new links are generated on
t = 2, thereby altering cross-firm distances in the network, the spatial correlation of
R&D stocks in period 2 would still reflect period 1 circumstances, regardless of any
potential serial dependence in the shocks (ωit, $it) over time.
Dynamic R&D Programming
The dynamic programming extension of the problem differs in that the decisions about
Ri2 are based on the information set available at time t = 2 and on the observation
of first period choices, which might reveal information about (ω2,$2). In this case,
the First Order Conditions read as:
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− e$i2 = 0
to assess whether the results from Proposition 2 still hold, I distinguish two cases.





















a circumstance that arises if shocks are uncorrelated across periods or firms do
not observe period 1 choices of other sufficiently distant firms. In this case the
results from Proposition 2 are still valid, provided that the network grows over
time and no connections are severed. The intuition is that in each period, the
game is similar to the static model analyzed in the text. The main difference is
that optimal R&D flows also incorporate the expected future marginal produc-
tivity of R&D, itself a function of the current information set. Hence, the logic
expressed by the proof of Proposition 2 still applies. However, a problem arises
if some connections are severed over time. If at time t a link is lost between
any two firms i and j (g(ij)s 6= 0, g(ij)t = 0 for s ≤ t) then the cross-correlation
between ωi and logSjt might be nonzero even if i and j are now located at
distance higher than Ct + Lt, due to the past connection (similarly if interme-
diate links between i and j are lost). This is a minor concern in the case of the
network in this article, as it tends to tighten and become denser over time.
2. Past R&D flows do reveal information about current shocks, as firms are able
to recover past shocks of all other firms in the network and use them to predict
current shocks (provided that shocks are serially correlated). This circumstance
would invalidate Proposition 2, because the model would be similar to a com-
plete information game in periods later than t = 1. However, this scenario is
not realistic given the evidence provided in Figure 5. In order to rationalize this
fact, I make four, not mutually excludable hypotheses.
(a) The unobserved shocks are serially uncorrelated, which is unlikely.
(b) For the most part, firms pre-commit to R&D investment plans.
(c) Between periods, firms do not actually observe the choices of “sufficiently
distant” firms. A variation of this idea is that it is too costly for firms to
gather and use such “distant” information, as it does not have a first order
impact on their outcomes.
(d) The pattern of cross-firm R&D complementarities is more complex than in
the ultimately simplistic expression of “knowledge capital” from (1). Sup-
pose that the R&D stock Sit of a firm can be split into several “projects,”
and that some projects are complementary across (connected) firms while
others are not. In this circumstance, firms would not respond to the choices
of “sufficiently distant” firms – even if their shocks are known – because
these might not affect, in equilibrium, the relevant “projects” of connected
firms. This is an intriguing piece of intuition towards further development
of the theoretical framework presented in this work.
In either scenario, the model has a unique equilibrium, provided that the spillovers
parameter δ is sufficiently small. The proof is once again omitted.
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Appendix C Data and Connection Measures
In this appendix I provide details on the dataset construction, with emphasis on the
calculation of the connection measures.
C.1 BSV Data
The main panel of firms has been reconstructed by Bloom et al. (2013) by selecting
firms from COMPUSTAT with entries in the “Segment” complementary dataset; the
latter breaks down the sales of firms by four-digit sector. All variables employed in
the estimation of the production function, market value and patent outcome models
are constructed according to standard methodologies; in particular, monetary values
are deflated using appropriate price indices (see the online appendix BSV for details).
COMPUSTAT firm-level identifiers are matched to patents through the NBER patent
dataset developed until 2006 (Hall et al., 2001). All the observed patents for each firm
i in the entire time interval under analysis are broken down into 426 patent classes
defined by the USPTO. Following Jaffe, BSV calculate the TECH weights as the














where Ti = (T1, . . . , T426) is the vector that collects the shares of patents of each firm
across the 426 patent classes. Note that these weights are constant over time. The
Jaffe measure of technological proximity is constructed as the average of all other
firms’ R&D stock weighted by the TECH measures, Spilltechit =
∑
j TECHijSjt.
The BSV measure of “business stealing” is similarly constructed, with so-called SIC
weights that measure the uncentered correlation of two firms’ allocation of sales by
sector, and Spillsicit =
∑
j SICijSjt. To facilitate comparisons, I employ the same
variables in my estimates; they enter logarithmically into (12).
C.2 Measures of Connection
To calculate the measures of connection, I need information on i) the disambiguated
identity of all the actual inventors who signed all the patents attributed to the firms,
ii) their patent collaboration relationships; iii) the time interval in which each inven-
tor is associated to a firm. I obtain information on i) and ii) thanks to the dataset
by Li et al. (2014), which I match to the NBER patent data through unique USPTO
patent identifiers. I rely on the work by Li et al. for the quality of their disambigua-
tion algorithm; see their paper and data documentation for additional details. Still, I
have no direct information about iii). In order to associate individuals to firms, I use
indirect information extrapolated from all patents granted between 1976 and 2006.
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The dataset allows to identify all assignees associated with the patents of an indi-
vidual inventor. Thus, by characterizing the time interval in which every individual is
observed to collaborate on the patents assigned to a specific firm, I can approximate
the actual spell of an inventor-firm association. Specifically, let vmi be the first year
(application year) when inventor m is observed patenting for firm i; similarly, vmi be
the last year. The assignment rule between inventor m and firm i in year t is:
v(mi)t =
{
1 if t ∈ [vmi − 1, vmi + 1]
0 otherwise
the linkage is extended one year in the past relative to vmi and one year in the future
relative to vmi. This choice is motivated on the presumption that every collaboration
does not begin immediately the year the first patent is being applied for, and does not
terminate immediately after the last patent. Clearly, this rule might miss those years
when an inventor, while not producing patents, is still part of the organization. This
would be a problem (by generating issues of measurement error) if these idle inventors
were connected to individuals in other firms; on the other hand, it is arguable that idle
inventors are not the most active in the process of knowledge creation and exchange.
Such a restricted time window essentially captures the size of a firm’s R&D-performing
team, whether it is composed by regular employees or, say, academic collaborators. It
is a reassuring fact that the results are very robust to perturbations of this assignment
rule (such additional results are available upon request).
One can collect all the binary indicators v(mi)t in a matrix Vt which has N rows
(number of firms in the data) and Mt columns (the number of inventors at time t).
In order to calculate the connection measures, one should first obtain the binary and
symmetric adjacency matrix Pt of connected inventors at time t. This is a matrix of
dimension Mt ×Mt where p(mn)t = p(mn)t = 1 if the two inventors m and n have at
least one joint patent at t+ 1. Define B(·) as a boolean operator that, when applied
to a matrix, returns another matrix whose entries are equal to 1 for positive original
entries and 0 otherwise. One can easily calculate the asymmetric N ×N matrix that
counts the reciprocal connections between inventors across firms at time t as follows:




= B (VtPt) ·VTt
and obtain the numerator of the expression within parentheses in (10) for every pair
of firms as k(ij)t + k(ji)t. Observe how the diagonal elements of Kt correspond to the
total number of inventors assigned to one firm in year t. Hence, the denominator of
the aforementioned argument of (10) can be obtained as k(ii)t + k(jj)t. Therefore, for









C.3 Geographic Control and Measures of Proximity
The measure of “geographic spillovers” included in the analysis accounts for the rela-
tive spatial proximity of two R&D teams. In analogy with the main spillovers variable,
this additional variable is based on R&D weights called measures of proximity ; unlike
connections g(ij)t, however, these proximity metrics identify inventors as “linked” not
because of joint past patents, but if they are “neighbors” in space. Specifically, in each
year I assign every inventor to a 2006 Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA) by match-
ing the latter to inventors’ ZIP codes reported on patents. I make some assumptions
to address cases of inventors with multiple ZIP codes or few observed patents in a
given sequence of years (details are available upon request). In analogy with connec-
tions, I calculate proximity measures w(ij)t as follows (note that the denominator in
the expression below also counts inventors outside US CBSAs, including foreign).
w(ij)t =
√
(#inventors of firms i and j overlapping on the same CBSAs at t)
(# inv.s of firm i at t) + (# inv.s of firm j at t)
Figure C.1 below displays the yearly distributions of proximity metrics w(ij)t condi-
tional on w(ij)t > 0; it is similar to that of connections g(ij)t from Figure 3 but it is
less asymmetric. The mean value of w(ij)t is 0.051 with 0.035 standard deviation; the
maximum value of w(ij)t is 0.5. The actual geographic spillover variables employed in
estimations is constructed as
∑
j 6=iw(ij)tlogSjt.
Figure C.1: Distribution of the proximity weights w(ij)t over time
C.3
Appendix D Graphical Description of the Network
This appendix collects some visual representations of the network in the form of
graphs. For ease of comparison, all nodes (firms) are placed in the same position and
have the same size across all figures. Node size is proportional to the total strength
of links g¯i summed over all the years. In addition, in Figures from D.1 to D.5 nodes
are distinguished by various shades of the orange color; in particular, darker shades
denote larger values of network centrality associated with a specific node. The names
of selected firms are apposed to some of the largest, most central nodes in the network.
A brief introduction or commentary for each of these graphs is given in the list below.
• Figure D.1 displays the network in 1985.
• Figure D.2 displays the network in 1990.
• Figure D.3 displays the network in 1995.
• Figure D.4 displays the network in 2000.
• Figure D.5 displays the “pooled” network, which results from aggregating all
edges (connections) over time across all firm pairs.
• Figure D.6 displays the communities obtained through the Louvain algorithm
with ϕ = 1.0 resolution. There are in total 6 communities: the semiconductor-
electronics-ICT, the mechanical, the biotech-pharmaceutical and the chemical
industries are identifiable as separate clusters; moreover there are two smaller,
mixed groups whose nodes are dispersed across the graph.
• Figure D.8 displays the communities obtained through the Louvain algorithm
with ϕ = 0.8 resolution. There are in total 10 communities.
• Figure D.8 displays the communities obtained through the Louvain algorithm
with ϕ = 0.6 resolution. There are in total 20 communities. This partition is
used to cluster standard errors in all empirical estimates presented in this work.
D.1
Figure D.1: The Network in 1985
D.2
Figure D.2: The Network in 1990
D.3
Figure D.3: The Network in 1995
D.4
Figure D.4: The Network in 2000
D.5
Figure D.5: The “Pooled” Network
D.6
Figure D.6: Network Communities, Resolution ϕ = 1
D.7
Figure D.7: Network Communities, Resolution ϕ = 0.8
D.8
Figure D.8: Network Communities, Resolution ϕ = 0.6
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Appendix E Additional Empirical Results
In this appendix I provide additional empirical estimates of the production function
model (12). The appendix is split in five parts. In the first part, I report the reduced
form estimates associated with the 2SLS results discussed in section 4. In the second
part I describe the System GMM estimation procedure in detail; in addition I discuss
the estimates of the ρ-differenced model. In the third part I report 2SLS and System
GMM estimates of the production function extended to firms outside the network.
In the fourth part I discuss some preliminary evidence about estimates performed on
selected subsets of the data (restricted either by firm size or by industry classification).
In the fifth part I discuss connection measures that are alternative to the square root
metric, and I report empirical estimates obtained from employing these alternatives
in model (12) in substitution of the standard weights.
E.1 Reduced Form Estimates
Table E.1: Production Function, Reduced Form Estimates, 1981-2001
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Private R&D (γ) 0.0580∗∗∗ 0.0576∗∗∗ 0.0613∗∗∗ 0.0595∗∗∗ 0.0556∗∗∗
(0.0116) (0.0113) (0.0115) (0.0125) (0.0137)
Dist. 2 Instrument (×10−3) 0.0543∗∗∗ 0.0502∗∗∗
(0.0125) (0.0156)
Dist. 3 Instrument (×10−3) 0.0035 0.0115∗∗ 0.0119∗∗ 0.0111∗∗
(0.0060) (0.0046) (0.0044) (0.0047)
Geographic Spillovers 0.0022 0.0022 0.0022 0.0019 0.0010
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0022) (0.0026) (0.0022)
Capital 0.2048∗∗∗ 0.2047∗∗∗ 0.2095∗∗∗ 0.2080∗∗∗ 0.2081∗∗∗
(0.0196) (0.0197) (0.0200) (0.0218) (0.0206)
Labor 0.6632∗∗∗ 0.6627∗∗∗ 0.6560∗∗∗ 0.6538∗∗∗ 0.6546∗∗∗
(0.0353) (0.0351) (0.0352) (0.0358) (0.0364)
Jaffe Tech. Proximity 0.0549 0.0554 0.0729 0.0390 0.0545
(0.0576) (0.0573) (0.0653) (0.0838) (0.0874)
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES
Only Network YES YES YES YES YES
No. of Communities
(Community × Year Effects) 0 0 0 10 20
No. of Observations 7607 7607 7607 7607 7607
Notes: The table reports reduced form estimates associated with first stage and 2SLS estimates
from Tables 3 and 4, respectively (see the notes of these tables for details). Instrumental variables
are scaled by a 10−3 factor for better interpretation of the associated coefficients.
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Table E.1 reports reduced form estimates of model (12), where instead of the spillover
variable, selected distance D instruments are included on the right-hand side. These
are scaled by a 10−3 factor to facilitate the interpretation of the associated estimates.
As expected, the instruments are positively associated with the dependent variable.
Most notably, when both distance 2 and distance 3 instruments are included (column
2), the coefficient of the latter is estimated not statistically different from zero. This
should clear concerns about its corresponding first stage estimate from Table 3, which
is negative and weakly significant (see the discussion in footnote 28).
E.2 Estimates of the ρ-differenced Model
I describe next the System GMM approach to production function estimation, which
is based on Blundell and Bond (2000). Under assumption (18) one obtains:
log Yit = αi (1− ρ) + ρ log Yi(t−1) +
Q∑
q=1













+ τt − ρτt−1 + εit
by subtracting from both sides of (12) the ρ-multiplied, lagged version of (12) itself.
The above can be rewritten as:
log Yit = α
′




φq0 logXitq + φq1 logXi(t−1)q
)
+ χ0 logSit+
+ χ1 logSi(t−1) + θ0
N∑
j=1
g(ij)t logSjt + θ1
N∑
j=1
g(ij)(t−1) logSj(t−1) + τ ′t + εit (E.1)
implying the so-called “common factor” restrictions λ = ρ; φq0 = βq and φq1 = −ρβq
for q = 1, . . . , Q; χ0 = γ; χ1 = −ργ; θ0 = δ; θ1 = −ρδ in addition to α′i = αi (1− ρ)
and τ ′t = τt− ρτt−1. Since these restrictions are typically rejected by the data (as the
time feedback between inputs, especially stock variables, and output is more nuanced)
following standard practice I recover the structural parameters of (12) from estimates























and I calculate standard errors through the Delta Method.
E.2
To illustrate how I estimate the parameters of (E.1), I let Xi1 = Kit be the capital
input and Xi2 = Eit be the labor input. As per the standard System GMM approach,



















 · (α′i + εit)
 = 0








= 0 for q = 3, . . . , Q.
In addition, I include year dummies and, for selected estimates, community-by-year
dummies. As specified in the text of the article I set s ≥ 3; furthermore, for selected
estimates, I substitute the spillover instruments in the level equation with moments
(19), which are based on the proposed distance D instruments.
Because of the assumption that I make about the spatial cross-correlation of the
error term (which extend to εit) and the chosen clustering scheme that I implement
for the calculation of standard errors, a couple of considerations are in order.
• Standard GMM overidentification statistics are not consistent, either because
the assumptions that motivate them are violated or because the actual degrees
of freedom of the model are too few. Consequently I do not report them.
• After recovering the structural parameters along with their standard errors via
(E.2), I perform statistical inferences assuming that t-ratios follow a Student’s T
distribution with a number of degrees of freedom equal to that of the estimated
ρ-differenced model (with 20 clusters, this corresponds to 19 degrees of freedom).
The statistical motivation is in the spirit of Bester et al. (2011). Since clusters
are large, a Central Limit Theorem argument can be invoked to argue that the
contribution of each cluster to the variance-covariance matrix of the estimates of
(E.1) follows asymptotically a multivariate normal distribution. The use of the
Delta Method, whose asymptotics rest on the fact that the original estimates of
(E.1) are consistent, effectively applies the same linear transformation to each of
these cluster contributions. If the probability limits of the variances of the RHS
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variables of (E.1) are uniform across clusters (as in Bester et al., Assumption 3)
the resulting t-ratios are by construction Student T distributed with a number
of degrees of freedom that equals the number of clusters minus one.
Table E.2: Production Function, Estimates of the ρ-differenced Model, 1981-2001
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sales (t− 1) 0.8710∗∗∗ 0.8367∗∗∗ 0.8351∗∗∗ 0.8382∗∗∗ 0.8369∗∗∗
(0.0164) (0.0157) (0.0190) (0.0198) (0.0171)
Private R&D (t) 0.0570 0.0481 0.0536 0.0559 0.0511
(0.0333) (0.0332) (0.0323) (0.0341) (0.0383)
Private R&D (t− 1) -0.0411 -0.0353 -0.0378 -0.0417 -0.0402
(0.0277) (0.0284) (0.0274) (0.0301) (0.0336)
R&D Spillovers (t) 0.0052∗ 0.0041 0.0064∗∗ 0.0054∗∗ 0.0052∗
(0.0030) (0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0024) (0.0029)
R&D Spillovers (t− 1) -0.0039 -0.0017 -0.0037 -0.0020 -0.0018
(0.0036) (0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0030) (0.0033)
Capital (t) 0.1214∗∗∗ 0.1343∗∗∗ 0.1348∗∗∗ 0.1384∗∗∗ 0.1365∗∗∗
(0.0316) (0.0308) (0.0306) (0.0322) (0.0340)
Capital (t− 1) -0.0862∗∗ -0.0921∗∗ -0.0919∗∗ -0.0940∗∗ -0.0884∗∗
(0.0366) (0.0380) (0.0380) (0.0384) (0.0400)
Labor (t) 0.6253∗∗∗ 0.6219∗∗∗ 0.6245∗∗∗ 0.6114∗∗∗ 0.6182∗∗∗
(0.0386) (0.0426) (0.0433) (0.0389) (0.0402)
Labor (t− 1) -0.5537∗∗∗ -0.5224∗∗∗ -0.5233∗∗∗ -0.5145∗∗∗ -0.5195∗∗∗
(0.0327) (0.0333) (0.0368) (0.0348) (0.0320)
Lags s of GMM-style IVs s ≥ 3 s ≥ 3 s ≥ 3 s ≥ 3 s ≥ 3
Diff. Eq. Spillover IVs Standard Standard Standard Standard Standard
Level Eq. Spillover IVs Standard D = 2 D = 3 D = 3 D = 3
Time Effects YES YES YES YES YES
Only Network YES YES YES YES YES
No. of Communities
(Community × Year Eff.) 0 0 0 10 20
COMFAC Wald statistic 6.75 7.43 10.84 13.19 7.88
(p-value) (0.0015) (0.0009) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0006)
No. of Instruments 978 962 962 1142 1342
No. of Observations 7185 7185 7185 7185 7185
Notes: This table reports estimates of model (E.1). The associated estimates of the structural
parameters are given in the corresponding columns of Table 5 in the text, see that for estimation
details. In addition, in this table I report Wald tests about the common factor restrictions implied
by the model (COMFAC) for the displayed coefficients. The Wald statistics are assumed to be F
distributed with denominator degrees of freedom equal to the degrees of freedom of the model.
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Table E.2 shows the estimates of model (E.1) from which the parameter estimates
of Table 5 are calculated. To economize on space, the coefficients for the geographic
spillovers variable and the Jaffe measure are not reported. Some features of the results
are common to all estimates. First, the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is
estimated very precisely always taking values higher than 0.83. This denotes that the
data are highly persistent, which is a common feature of firm-level data. Second, the
common factor restrictions are always rejected with infinitesimal associated p-values.
This is due to the fact that the effect of stock variables on output is distributed over
time (note that the only variable for which the structural estimate of Table 5 closely
matches the time t coefficient in Table E.2 is the labor input). To illustrate, consider
the estimates associated with the spillover variables in column (4): θˆ0 ' 0.0055 for
the time t elasticity and θˆ1 ' −0.0024 for the time t−1 elasticity. Since the coefficient




indicates that much of lagged external R&D also affects future variations of output (or
else the ratio would be close to one, as in the case of the labor input). The economic
interpretation is that, as it is widely known, the returns to current knowledge build
up over time. Finally, it is important to remark that while none of the private R&D
coefficients from Table E.2 is statistically significant, the sum χ0 + χ1 is typically
significant (obviously, current and past R&D share common variation). For example,
the Wald test for H0 : χ0+χ1 = 0 returns a p-value of 2.4% in the case of the estimates
from column (3), a p-value of 1.4% for those in column (4), and a p-value of 8.6% in
the case of column (5). These tests are not reported in Table E.2 for brevity.
E.3 Estimates Extended to the Whole Sample
Tables E.3 and E.4 illustrate, respectively, 2SLS and System GMM estimates of the
production function conducted on the whole sample – that is, not restricted to firms
that ever enter the spillover network. The estimates about the geographic spillovers
and the Jaffe measure are once again omitted for space reasons. With both methods δ
is estimated similarly to the restricted sample case; in fact, by comparing the results
from the restricted and non-restricted samples obtained under the same specification,
one observes that δ is always estimated larger in the whole sample case. By contrast,
γ is always estimated smaller with the whole sample and, in the case of System GMM
(which is more prone to issues of statistical power) it is never estimated significantly
different from zero. Most likely, this is to be attributed to the fact that firms outside
the network are structurally different from those inside it, the former being less R&D
intensive and productive than the latter. Estimates restricted to firms that ever enter
network are likely to be more robust to this kind of unobserved heterogeneity.
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Table E.3: Production Function, Two Stages Least Squares Estimates, 1981-2001
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Private R&D (γ) 0.0425∗∗∗ 0.0427∗∗∗ 0.0360∗∗∗ 0.0340∗∗∗ 0.0331∗∗∗
(0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0097) (0.0106) (0.0108)
R&D Spillovers (δ) 0.0174∗∗∗ 0.0169∗∗∗ 0.0299∗∗∗ 0.0268∗∗∗ 0.0249∗∗∗
(0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0073) (0.0082) (0.0092)
Capital 0.2047∗∗∗ 0.2050∗∗∗ 0.1979∗∗∗ 0.1952∗∗∗ 0.1959∗∗∗
(0.0148) (0.0148) (0.0157) (0.0166) (0.0161)
Labor 0.6590∗∗∗ 0.6588∗∗∗ 0.6641∗∗∗ 0.6634∗∗∗ 0.6634∗∗∗
(0.0251) (0.0251) (0.0257) (0.0262) (0.0266)
Spillovers IV(s) D = 2 D = 2, 3 D = 3 D = 3 D = 3
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES
Only Network NO NO NO NO NO
No. of Communities
(Community × Year Effects) 0 0 0 10 20
No. of Observations 12503 12503 12503 12503 12503
Notes: The estimates in this table replicates those in Table 4, but without restricting the sample
to firms that are part of the connections network. See the notes to Table 4 for estimation details.
Table E.4: Production Function, System GMM Estimates, 1981-2001
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Private R&D (γ) 0.0769 0.0284 0.0589 0.0331 0.0218
(0.0483) (0.0379) (0.0360) (0.0330) (0.0358)
R&D Spillovers (δ) 0.0142 0.0222∗∗ 0.0220∗∗ 0.0269∗∗∗ 0.0283∗∗∗
(0.0097) (0.0091) (0.0096) (0.0088) (0.0094)
Capital 0.2360∗∗∗ 0.2330∗∗∗ 0.2357∗∗∗ 0.2224∗∗∗ 0.2261∗∗∗
(0.0520) (0.0566) (0.0554) (0.0585) (0.0613)
Labor 0.6261∗∗∗ 0.6785∗∗∗ 0.6763∗∗∗ 0.6896∗∗∗ 0.6985∗∗∗
(0.0772) (0.0776) (0.0769) (0.0799) (0.0852)
Lags s of GMM-style IVs s ≥ 3 s ≥ 3 s ≥ 3 s ≥ 3 s ≥ 3
Diff. Eq. Spillover IVs Standard Standard Standard Standard Standard
Level Eq. Spillover IVs Standard D = 2 D = 3 D = 3 D = 3
Time Effects YES YES YES YES YES
Only Network NO NO NO NO NO
No. of Communities
(Community × Year Effects) 0 0 0 10 20
No. of Instruments 978 962 962 1142 1342
No. of Observations 11796 11796 11796 11796 11796
Notes: The estimates in this table replicates those in Table 5, but without restricting the sample
to firms that are part of the connections network. See the notes to Table 5 for estimation details.
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E.4 Estimates Restricted to Subsets of the Data
In what follows I present empirical results based on selected subsets of the data. Be-
fore describing the different partitions and the associated estimates, it must remarked
that I refrain from performing System GMM estimation on these smaller subsamples.
In fact, System GMM is a very data demanding procedure, which is unlikely to work
well upon reducing the number of observations further. However, despite the smaller
samples I still calculate standard errors under the conservative clustering approach
based on network “communities” that I have employed throughout the analysis.
Table E.5: Production Function Estimates by Firm Size, 1981-2001
Small Firms Large Firms
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Private R&D (γ) 0.0478∗ 0.0407∗ 0.0565∗∗ 0.0591∗∗
(0.0260) (0.0224) (0.0211) (0.0218)
R&D Spillovers (δ) 0.0165∗∗ 0.0353∗∗ 0.0126∗∗∗ 0.0099
(0.0065) (0.0125) (0.0040) (0.0160)
Geographic Spillovers -0.0094 -0.0077 0.0038 0.0037
(0.0070) (0.0076) (0.0033) (0.0040)
Capital 0.1557∗∗∗ 0.1535∗∗∗ 0.2604∗∗∗ 0.2640∗∗∗
(0.0242) (0.0237) (0.0299) (0.0285)
Labor 0.7460∗∗∗ 0.7401∗∗∗ 0.5646∗∗∗ 0.5612∗∗∗
(0.0439) (0.0431) (0.0446) (0.0458)
Jaffe Tech. Proximity 0.1638∗ 0.1560∗ -0.0307 -0.0151
(0.0859) (0.0768) (0.1394) (0.1918)
Estimation OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
Only Network YES YES YES YES
No. of Communities
(Community × Year Effects) 20 20 20 20
No. of Observations 3800 3800 3807 3807
Notes: The table displays separate estimates of model (12) for the “small” and “large”
firms in the network, respectively. For both groups, column (1) reports OLS estimates,
while column (2) reports 2SLS estimates performed with the D = 3 instrument only.
All estimates include firm and year fixed effects, as well as community-by-year dummies
for 20 communities. Standard errors are clustered by the usual set of 20 communities
(small sample corrections are applied). Asterisks denote conventional significance levels
of t-tests (∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01).
In Table E.5 I present estimates that are obtained by splitting the sample of firms
that ever enter the network by firm size. Specifically, I calculate each firm’s average
number of employees over the time interval when that firm is observed, and I classify a
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firm as “small” if it falls before the median of average size, and conversely as “large” if
its average size equals or surpasses the median. I separately estimate the production
function for both groups via either OLS or 2SLS (using the distance 3 instrument).
This exercise is restricted to firms in the network because performing it on the whole
sample would be largely redundant, as firms in the network are typically larger than
those outside of it and the main results are based on the network subsample.
The results evidence that, while OLS estimates of δ are statistically significant
for both groups, the 2SLS estimate for small firms is larger and significantly different
from zero (δˆ ' 0.035), while that for large firms is smaller and not significantly
different from zero. Since small firms are less productive (their revenue per employee
is on average $150,000 versus $191,000 for the large firms, 1996 dollars) this can be
seen as preliminary evidence in favor of the hypothesis that the negative bias of OLS
estimates is due to spillovers mostly benefiting smaller and less productive firms. Also
note that the coefficients associated with the Jaffe measure is positive and statistically
significant (albeit weakly) for small firms, which is consistent with the interpretation
about the results for the Jaffe measure that has been given in footnote 28 of the text.
I execute a similar exercise for four selections of the sample that are defined by
their industry classification. Specifically, I construct four groups of firms that operate
in technologically related areas (as informed by primary SIC codes) for which I have
enough observations in the data to obtain statistically meaningful estimates. Firms
outside the network are allowed. For each group I perform OLS and 2SLS estimates
(using the Distance 3 instrument) which are reported in Table E.6. The four selections
are described below, along with some comment about the relative empirical estimates.
• BIPHOC: Biotech, Pharmaceutical and Organic Chemistry (primary SIC codes
in the range 2820-2880). For this extended industry I do not obtain significant
OLS estimates of δ; with 2SLS however, I get γˆ ' 0.087 and δˆ ' 0.032, both in
the high range (but they are statistically significant at the 10% level only).
• IMACH: Industrial Machinery, excluding office machinery like computers and
similar electronic equipment (primary SIC codes in the range 3510-3560). I get
significant estimates of δ under both OLS and 2SLS, but twice as large for 2SLS
for a staggering δˆ ' 0.072 (with γˆ ' 0.038).
• ELELCOM: Electrical, Electronic and Communication sectors, excluding semi-
conductors as the inclusion of this unique sector affects the results wildly (pri-
mary SIC codes in the range 3600-3695, excluding 3674). The OLS estimate of
δ is halved and becomes not statistically significant upon moving to 2SLS.
• OLMIN: Optical, Laboratory and Medical Instruments (primary SIC codes in
the range 3821-3851). Neither OLS nor 2SLS estimates of δ are economically or
statistically significant, but “geographic spillovers” seem to matter in this case.
This exercise shows that, in general, connections-induced spillovers are heterogeneous
across industries, and are by no means restricted to frontier technologies.
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Table E.6: Production Function Estimates by Industry, 1981-2001
BIPHOC IMACH
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Private R&D (γ) 0.1101∗∗ 0.0876∗ 0.0445∗∗ 0.0385∗∗
(0.0457) (0.0477) (0.0169) (0.0178)
R&D Spillovers (δ) 0.0038 0.0318∗ 0.0310∗∗∗ 0.0721∗∗∗
(0.0052) (0.0185) (0.0096) (0.0189)
Geographic Spillovers -0.0043 -0.0048 0.0013 -0.0019
(0.0066) (0.0069) (0.0076) (0.0082)
Capital 0.2563∗∗∗ 0.2680∗∗∗ 0.2144∗∗∗ 0.1998∗∗∗
(0.0480) (0.0503) (0.0373) (0.0360)
Labor 0.6465∗∗∗ 0.6753∗∗∗ 0.7003∗∗∗ 0.6992∗∗∗
(0.1139) (0.1300) (0.0333) (0.0358)
Estimation OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
No. of Observations 1012 1012 953 953
ELELCOM OLMIN
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Private R&D (γ) 0.0594∗ 0.0625∗ 0.0712∗∗ 0.0712∗∗
(0.0314) (0.0329) (0.0344) (0.0348)
R&D Spillovers (δ) 0.0206∗ 0.0111 0.0003 -0.0058
(0.0110) (0.0443) (0.0042) (0.0133)
Geographic Spillovers 0.0073∗ 0.0061 0.0175∗∗ 0.0171∗∗
(0.0037) (0.0070) (0.0081) (0.0083)
Capital 0.2017∗∗∗ 0.2061∗∗∗ 0.0852∗∗∗ 0.0867∗∗∗
(0.0551) (0.0612) (0.0278) (0.0285)
Labor 0.5791∗∗∗ 0.5773∗∗∗ 0.7896∗∗∗ 0.7921∗∗∗
(0.0853) (0.0866) (0.0403) (0.0428)
Estimation OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
No. of Observations 1546 1546 1049 1049
Notes: The table displays separate estimates of model (12) relative to four subsets of the
sample, which are distinguished by industry (see the text of the Appendix for detailed
description). Subsamples are not restricted to firms belonging to the spillovers network.
For each subsample, column (1) reports OLS estimates, while column (2) reports 2SLS
estimates performed with the D = 3 instrument only. All estimates include firm and
year fixed effects but no community-by-year dummies. Standard errors are clustered
by the usual set of 20 communities (small sample corrections are applied). Asterisks
denote conventional significance levels of t-tests (∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01).
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E.5 Alternative Connection Measures
In what follows I illustrate some alternative connection measures c(ij)t. After briefly
introducing each, I present relevant empirical results obtained by using it in place of
the square-root metric (11), along with estimates of the MPR and MSR. Recall that
the MSR depends on the distribution of c(ij)t, which differs across measures.
• Linear Connection. I use a pure linear connection measure c(ij)t (that is, in
(10) f (·) is an identity function). This measure does not give disproportionate
importance to few connected inventors that are part of two large R&D teams.
Table E.7: Results for the Linear Connection Measure, 1981-2001
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Private R&D (γ) 0.0385∗∗∗ 0.0543∗∗∗ 0.0485∗∗∗ 0.0806∗
(0.0115) (0.0143) (0.0133) (0.0405)
R&D Spillovers (δ) 0.0632∗∗∗ 0.0579∗∗∗ 0.1546∗∗ 0.1689∗∗
(0.0154) (0.0147) (0.0654) (0.0730)
Geographic Spillovers 0.0023 0.0018 0.0030 0.0127
(0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0115)
Capital 0.2032∗∗∗ 0.2056∗∗∗ 0.1975∗∗∗ 0.2927∗∗
(0.0144) (0.0196) (0.0213) (0.1071)
Labor 0.6567∗∗∗ 0.6585∗∗∗ 0.6654∗∗∗ 0.5933∗∗∗
(0.0249) (0.0360) (0.0378) (0.1214)
Jaffe Tech. Proximity 0.1271∗ 0.0334 -0.0112 -0.0628∗∗
(0.0694) (0.0855) (0.0740) (0.0291)
Estimator OLS OLS 2SLS SGMM
Fixed Effects YES YES YES (Year)
Only Network NO YES YES YES
No. of Communities
(Community × Year Effects) 20 20 20 20
No. of Observations 12503 7607 7607 7185
Notes: The table displays estimates of model (12) using the alternative connection
measure stated in the title. Columns (1) and (2) report OLS estimates, respectively
extended to the full sample and restricted to the network subsample. Columns (3)
and (4) respectively report 2SLS and System GMM estimates, both employingD = 3
instruments. All estimates include firm fixed effects (where applicable), year effects,
and community-by-year effects for 20 communities. Standard errors are clustered
by the usual set of 20 communities (small sample corrections are applied). Asterisks
denote conventional significance levels of t-tests (∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01).
– Using γˆ and δˆ from column (4) I calculate, among connected firms:
average MPR; 124%, average MSR: 148% (about 119% of the MPR).
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• Second Degree Connections. With this measure I extend definition of “con-
nected” inventors from the numerator of (10) so to allow for indirect linkages.
Specifically, for two inventors in different firms to be “connected” it is no longer
necessary that they be past collaborators, but it is enough that there is another
inventor who used to be a past collaborator of both. As in (11) I take the square
root of the ratio resulting from this alternative definition. Relative to the base-
line, this metric downplays connections with scientists who do not develop many
bonds within their own firm (like occasional inventors). The average value of
c(ij)t for this measure is 0.126, with 0.102 standard deviation.
Table E.8: Results for the Second Degree Connection Measure, 1981-2001
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Private R&D (γ) 0.0372∗∗∗ 0.0520∗∗∗ 0.0470∗∗∗ 0.0713∗∗
(0.0112) (0.0138) (0.0131) (0.0338)
R&D Spillovers (δ) 0.0046∗∗∗ 0.0042∗∗∗ 0.0078∗∗ 0.0065∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0036) (0.0027)
Geographic Spillovers 0.0022 0.0017 0.0023 0.0058
(0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0109)
Capital 0.2007∗∗∗ 0.2018∗∗∗ 0.1945∗∗∗ 0.2897∗∗
(0.0146) (0.0199) (0.0239) (0.1034)
Labor 0.6602∗∗∗ 0.6641∗∗∗ 0.6722∗∗∗ 0.6114∗∗∗
(0.0251) (0.0366) (0.0402) (0.1133)
Jaffe Tech. Proximity 0.1193∗ 0.0203 -0.0136 -0.0687∗∗
(0.0669) (0.0764) (0.0701) (0.0278)
Estimator OLS OLS 2SLS SGMM
Fixed Effects YES YES YES (Year)
Only Network NO YES YES YES
No. of Communities
(Community × Year Effects) 20 20 20 20
No. of Observations 12503 7607 7607 7185
Notes: The table displays estimates of model (12) using the alternative connection
measure stated in the title. Columns (1) and (2) report OLS estimates, respectively
extended to the full sample and restricted to the network subsample. Columns (3)
and (4) respectively report 2SLS and System GMM estimates, both employingD = 3
instruments. All estimates include firm fixed effects (where applicable), year effects,
and community-by-year effects for 20 communities. Standard errors are clustered
by the usual set of 20 communities (small sample corrections are applied). Asterisks
denote conventional significance levels of t-tests (∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01).
– Using γˆ and δˆ from column (4) I calculate, among connected firms:
average MPR: 111%; average MSR: 118% (about 106% of the MPR).
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• Polynomial Connections. This measure is analogous to the baseline square
root measure, in that it generates some “concavity” that gives relatively more
importance to firm pairs with fewer cross-firm inventor connections. However,
instead of using the square root function f (x) =
√
x, I construct this measure
by using the polynomial function f (x) = −x2 + 2x. Note that this is the only
concave polynomial function of second degree that conforms to the requirements
on f (·) and also achieves a maximum at 1. At values of x close to 0 this function
increases more slowly than the square root function. The average value of c(ij)t
for this measure is 0.022, with 0.050 standard deviation.
Table E.9: Results for the Polynomial Connection Measure, 1981-2001
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Private R&D (γ) 0.0383∗∗∗ 0.0539∗∗∗ 0.0483∗∗∗ 0.0789∗
(0.0115) (0.0143) (0.0132) (0.0401)
R&D Spillovers (δ) 0.0359∗∗∗ 0.0329∗∗∗ 0.0801∗∗ 0.0883∗∗
(0.0081) (0.0078) (0.0340) (0.0386)
Geographic Spillovers 0.0024 0.0019 0.0030 0.0128
(0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0114)
Capital 0.2029∗∗∗ 0.2051∗∗∗ 0.1975∗∗∗ 0.2920∗∗
(0.0144) (0.0196) (0.0215) (0.1073)
Labor 0.6569∗∗∗ 0.6590∗∗∗ 0.6655∗∗∗ 0.5948∗∗∗
(0.0249) (0.0359) (0.0378) (0.1213)
Jaffe Tech. Proximity 0.1256∗ 0.0310 -0.0109 -0.0624∗∗
(0.0692) (0.0847) (0.0740) (0.0288)
Estimator OLS OLS 2SLS SGMM
Fixed Effects YES YES YES (Year)
Only Network NO YES YES YES
No. of Communities
(Community × Year Effects) 20 20 20 20
No. of Observations 12503 7607 7607 7185
Notes: The table displays estimates of model (12) using the alternative connection
measure stated in the title. Columns (1) and (2) report OLS estimates, respectively
extended to the full sample and restricted to the network subsample. Columns (3)
and (4) respectively report 2SLS and System GMM estimates, both employingD = 3
instruments. All estimates include firm fixed effects (where applicable), year effects,
and community-by-year effects for 20 communities. Standard errors are clustered
by the usual set of 20 communities (small sample corrections are applied). Asterisks
denote conventional significance levels of t-tests (∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01).
– Using γˆ and δˆ from column (4) I calculate, among connected firms:
average MPR: 121%, average MSR: 145% (about 120% of the MPR).
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• Squared Connections. This measure is instead the opposite of the baseline
square root measure, as it replaces the latter with the “convex” square function
f (x) = x2. Obviously, its economic interpretation is reverse too: this measure
gives relatively more importance to spillovers occurring between firms with a lot
of inventor cross-connections. While this implication is perhaps unrealistic, it is
interesting to examine – for validation purposes – the consequences of choosing
this measure on the empirical estimates. In fact, δ is estimated very imprecisely
with this metric (the MPR and MRS must be taken with a grain of salt). The
average value of c(ij)t for this measure is 0.001, with 0.011 standard deviation.
Table E.10: Results for the Squared Connection Measure, 1981-2001
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Private R&D (γ) 0.0406∗∗∗ 0.0577∗∗∗ 0.0518∗∗ 0.1097∗∗
(0.0117) (0.0144) (0.0183) (0.0405)
R&D Spillovers (δ) 0.0716 0.0651 2.2043∗ 0.7093
(0.0600) (0.0616) (1.1804) (0.4162)
Geographic Spillovers 0.0017 0.0012 0.0040 0.0104
(0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0035) (0.0118)
Capital 0.2061∗∗∗ 0.2101∗∗∗ 0.1980∗∗∗ 0.3000∗∗∗
(0.0148) (0.0204) (0.0213) (0.1042)
Labor 0.6543∗∗∗ 0.6547∗∗∗ 0.6635∗∗∗ 0.5804∗∗∗
(0.0250) (0.0364) (0.0412) (0.1228)
Jaffe Tech. Proximity 0.1417∗∗ 0.0578 -0.0204 -0.0749∗∗
(0.0712) (0.0932) (0.0940) (0.0312)
Estimator OLS OLS 2SLS SGMM
Fixed Effects YES YES YES (Year)
Only Network NO YES YES YES
No. of Communities
(Community × Year Effects) 20 20 20 20
No. of Observations 12503 7607 7607 7185
Notes: The table displays estimates of model (12) using the alternative connection
measure stated in the title. Columns (1) and (2) report OLS estimates, respectively
extended to the full sample and restricted to the network subsample. Columns (3)
and (4) respectively report 2SLS and System GMM estimates, both employingD = 3
instruments. All estimates include firm fixed effects (where applicable), year effects,
and community-by-year effects for 20 communities. Standard errors are clustered
by the usual set of 20 communities (small sample corrections are applied). Asterisks
denote conventional significance levels of t-tests (∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01).
– Using γˆ and δˆ from column (4) I calculate, among connected firms:
average MPR: 169%, average MSR: 183% (about 108% of the MPR).
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• Asymmetric “Receiving” Connections. By abandoning the framework of
directed networks one can consider the possibility that spillover relationships are
asymmetric between firms. Suppose in particular that the degree of a firm’s ac-
cess to the knowledge of another firm depends only by its own share of connected
inventors: k(ij)t/k(ii)t. By applying the usual square root function to this ratio,
the result is the asymmetric “receiving” connection measure c(ij)t =
√
k(ij)t/k(ii)t
(see Appendix C). This metric gives more importance to smaller, well connected
firms in the process of ideas exchange. The average value of c(ij)t for this mea-
sure is 0.118, with 0.127 standard deviation.
Table E.11: Results for the As. “Receiving” Connection Measure, 1981-2001
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Private R&D (γ) 0.0378∗∗∗ 0.0532∗∗∗ 0.0532∗∗∗ 0.0498
(0.0112) (0.0137) (0.0130) (0.0393)
R&D Spillovers (δ) 0.0093∗∗∗ 0.0086∗∗∗ 0.0086∗∗ 0.0202∗∗∗
(0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0037) (0.0065)
Geographic Spillovers 0.0023 0.0018 0.0018 0.0186
(0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0137)
Capital 0.2023∗∗∗ 0.2043∗∗∗ 0.2043∗∗∗ 0.2965∗∗
(0.0145) (0.0199) (0.0209) (0.1101)
Labor 0.6572∗∗∗ 0.6594∗∗∗ 0.6594∗∗∗ 0.6013∗∗∗
(0.0250) (0.0363) (0.0372) (0.1275)
Jaffe Tech. Proximity 0.1227∗ 0.0273 0.0270 -0.0529
(0.0683) (0.0817) (0.0782) (0.0308)
Estimator OLS OLS 2SLS SGMM
Fixed Effects YES YES YES (Year)
Only Network NO YES YES YES
No. of Communities
(Community × Year Effects) 20 20 20 20
No. of Observations 12503 7607 7607 7185
Notes: The table displays estimates of model (12) using the alternative connection
measure stated in the title. Columns (1) and (2) report OLS estimates, respectively
extended to the full sample and restricted to the network subsample. Columns (3)
and (4) respectively report 2SLS and System GMM estimates, both employingD = 3
instruments. All estimates include firm fixed effects (where applicable), year effects,
and community-by-year effects for 20 communities. Standard errors are clustered
by the usual set of 20 communities (small sample corrections are applied). Asterisks
denote conventional significance levels of t-tests (∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01).
– Using γˆ and δˆ from column (4) I calculate, among connected firms:
average MPR: 77%, average MSR: 97% (about 126% of the MPR).
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• Asymmetric “Spilling” Connections. An alternative economic assumption
is that spillovers do not depend on the active acquisition of knowledge by well-
connected firms, but rather by passive access to spontaneously leaked informa-
tion. In this scenario it would be more advantageous to have access to as many
inventors as possible among “spilling” firms. A connection measure that embod-
ies this idea reads as c(ij)t =
√
k(ji)t/k(jj)t (see Appendix C). This metric gives
more relevance to firms that are well connected to larger ones. However, it gives
rise to poor estimates of δ (and so, to an unreliable estimate of the MSR). The
average value of c(ij)t for this measure is 0.118, with 0.127 standard deviation.
Table E.12: Results for the As. “Spilling” Connection Measure, 1981-2001
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Private R&D (γ) 0.0381∗∗∗ 0.0535∗∗∗ 0.0348∗ 0.0909∗∗
(0.0115) (0.0143) (0.0196) (0.0352)
R&D Spillovers (δ) 0.0068∗∗∗ 0.0064∗∗ 0.0337 0.0106
(0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0211) (0.0065)
Geographic Spillovers 0.0015 0.0011 0.0007 -0.0003
(0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0028) (0.0133)
Capital 0.2028∗∗∗ 0.2051∗∗∗ 0.1820∗∗∗ 0.2918∗∗
(0.0147) (0.0202) (0.0338) (0.1032)
Labor 0.6574∗∗∗ 0.6597∗∗∗ 0.6821∗∗∗ 0.6023∗∗∗
(0.0253) (0.0369) (0.0460) (0.1142)
Jaffe Tech. Proximity 0.1215∗ 0.0228 -0.1374 -0.0810∗∗
(0.0699) (0.0877) (0.1704) (0.0314)
Estimator OLS OLS 2SLS SGMM
Fixed Effects YES YES YES (Year)
Only Network NO YES YES YES
No. of Communities
(Community × Year Effects) 20 20 20 20
No. of Observations 12503 7607 7607 7185
Notes: The table displays estimates of model (12) using the alternative connection
measure stated in the title. Columns (1) and (2) report OLS estimates, respectively
extended to the full sample and restricted to the network subsample. Columns (3)
and (4) respectively report 2SLS and System GMM estimates, both employingD = 3
instruments. All estimates include firm fixed effects (where applicable), year effects,
and community-by-year effects for 20 communities. Standard errors are clustered
by the usual set of 20 communities (small sample corrections are applied). Asterisks
denote conventional significance levels of t-tests (∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01).
– Using γˆ and δˆ from column (4) I calculate, among connected firms:
average MPR: 140%, average MSR: 146% (about 104% of the MPR).
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